THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

Dr. Carnegie Simpson's *Church Principles** arose out of notes made for the conferences on Reunion which have followed the Lambeth "Appeal" of 1920. His statement of the "necessity" of the Church leaves little to be denied. "The Church is more than founded by Christ," he says. "The Church is a part of the fact of Christ." "It is this solidarity between Christ and His people which is the creative and constitutive, the original and essential principle in the being and life of the Church." These are words that find an echo at once in all who believe in the Catholic Church; and they are removed *toto cœlo* from the individualism which has so often marked Protestant theology on the subject. But, having gone so far, can Dr. Carnegie Simpson fail to go further? If this doctrine be, as we agree that it is, that of the New Testament, is it not equally true that the New Testament bears clear witness to the apostolate, and to the ministry dependent on them, as the bond of unity in the One Body? Surely a body without a form is a contradiction in terms. With much of what he says of the ministerial character of the Priesthood we entirely agree: but he does not face the fact that "ministerial parity" (to use an old Presbyterian slogan) has no shadow of warrant in apostolic times. All our Biblical evidence points to two facts in connection with the Ministry; 1st, that it was varied, graded, differentiated; 2nd, that, in the case of presbyters and deacons at least, apostolic appointment was as indispensable as divine vocation. Whether or not apostolic succession can be maintained through presbyters, or at least through duly constituted presbyteries, is a question which has exercised Catholic theologians since the days of St. Jerome. But that any group of Christian persons who ask someone to act as their minister in spiritual things should

* Hodder and Stoughton. 5s. net.

expect such ministry to be *ipso facto* recognized as the Priesthood of the Church Universal is surely to introduce a very different proposition: and we cannot conceive any Reunion being brought about on such lines. There are other points, too, where we could join issue with Dr. Carnegie Simpson; but we would much rather thank him for a lucid and powerful exposition, and express the hope that it may be widely read.

Dr. Langford James has written an excellent monograph entitled *The Doctrine of Intention.** He distinguishes in effect three such doctrines: (*a*) That of the No-Intentionists, held by a large school in the twelfth century, and later by Luther, Calvin, and Jewell, who maintained that to make the validity of a sacrament depend in any way on the minister's intention was, in effect, to rob the Christian man of his assurance of salvation; (*b*) that of the Exterior-Intention School, represented by Catharinus at the Council of Trent, and by Hooker in England; and (*c*) that of the Interior-Intention School (*e.g.*, Bellarmine), who held that a sacrament was only valid if the minister's interior intention were pure. Dr. Langford-James inclines himself to the second of these views, and we do not doubt that he is right. Hooker, as usual, concludes the truth in a sentence, when he says that "the known intent of the Church generally doth suffice, and where the contrary is not manifest, we may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church of God." Perhaps it is worth noting that this principle is of wider application than to the sacraments only. *Pace* some of our more rigorist revisers, it is what justifies us in using the phrase "our most religious and gracious King" in public worship.

Two volumes of sermons have recently reached us. One is by Dr. Relton, and entitled *The Catholic Conception of the Incarnation.*† Readers of Canon Scott Holland's *Logic and Life* will remember the striking defence he there makes for the publication of sermons, on the ground that the preacher who is also a theologian cannot keep his two functions in watertight compartments, and will best bring home his theological teaching by printing what he preaches. Dr. Relton's *A Study of Christology* showed him as a student of the doctrine of the Incarnation; and the volume before us shows him expounding the Gospel of the Incarnation in the pulpit. They postulate, and no doubt found, a thoughtful congregation; and they will assuredly be of value now to a larger circle. The last three

* S.P.C.K. 1924. 86 pp. 3s. 6d. net. † *Ibid.*, 3s. 6d. net.

sermons deal with various aspects of Immortality. "The Problem of Judas," which concludes the series, is a fine title for a sermon on this subject, and gives occasion for the quotation of some remarkable verses by an American poetess. We gather that Dr. Relton inclines to partial restoration, even if only to a kind of limbo, for all: "Judas may find a place in the final state, though it be a lowly one, and not that which he might have attained to, had he never sinned."

The other volume includes discourses by the late Dr. Cooper, of Scottish fame, entitled *Kindness to the Dead*.* They well reveal the wide and humane learning and apostolic fervour of this devoted servant of the Church of Scotland; and their rich supply of historical allusion and local colour reminds one of similar features in the work of our own Tractarians.

THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: A STUDY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

V.—THE BREAD IS THE FLESH

AFTER the visit to Jerusalem recorded in the fifth chapter of the Fourth Gospel the scene changes abruptly from Jerusalem to Galilee. Why does a discourse delivered in Galilee form part of the story of the Gospel preached to Jerusalem? The story told in the sixth chapter gives the answer to the question.

The story begins with an independent record of the feeding of the five thousand, and the discourse recorded takes its rise from that event. The feeding of the five thousand is the central event in the story of our Lord's ministry. It is the meeting-point of the two stories, the story of the manifestation in Galilee, and the story of the manifestation to Jerusalem.

It becomes the meeting-point of the two stories, because at this moment the antagonism of Jerusalem follows our Lord down to Galilee. In the discourses of this chapter our Lord is speaking first to the Galileans. Then "the Jews" break in, "the Jews," who, in the Fourth Gospel, always mean the enemy; "His own," to whom He came, and "they received Him not." The feeding of the five thousand is the climax of the manifestation in Galilee, as the ministry to the immediate need of man. The manifestation in Galilee is near

* S.P.C.K. 1924. 3s. 6d. net.

its end. Our Lord's movements in Galilee are determined by three things—the antagonism of the Pharisees, the enthusiasm of the multitude, and the training of the disciples. All three at this time move Him to leave the scene of His ministry hitherto. It is with the enthusiasm of the multitude that we are here immediately concerned. It reaches its highest point at the feeding of the five thousand. They wanted to come by force and make Him a King. He is bound to elude their enthusiasm. It becomes one of the motives for retirement from Galilee. The enthusiasm was of the earth, earthy. The satisfaction of the bodily need—healing, food—so far He has led the Galileans. So far and no farther. It is at this point that the Fourth Gospel takes up the Galilean story. Our Lord tells them not to labour merely for the meat that perisheth. He tries to carry them on to the meat that endureth to everlasting life. He offers Himself as the bread of life, the bread that comes down from heaven. But He knows that only those who can respond to the drawing of the Father will be able to follow His teaching. He knows that of the multitude all that can really be said is that they believe not.

It is at this point that "the Jews" break in. "The bread that came down from heaven!" It is a divine claim, such as they have detected before at Jerusalem. Only if they yield to the drawing of the Father will they be able to accept it. He can but reiterate the claim. "I am the living bread that came down out of heaven." It is when He is thus face to face, with the absence indeed of any real response from the Galileans to the offer of spiritual life, but, beyond this, with the explicit repudiation by the Jews of His divine mission and origin, that, in reiterating His claim to be the bread of life, He adds the mysterious words which carry us a step further into the secrets of the gospel of life. Life, we have so far seen, is living communion with the Father. Life, we have now learnt, is to be fed and maintained through the appropriation of the life of the Son, the life which we receive, as the body receives food, which we assimilate, appropriate, make our own, convert into the substance of our bodily selves.

But now we go beyond this. "The bread which I will give is My flesh, for the life of the world." To the Jew, feeding on the flesh could suggest nothing but feeding on a sacrifice, and the reference becomes more inevitable as he proceeds with a relentless insistence, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His blood, ye have no life in yourselves." "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life." If there is to be for us an appropriation of the life of the Son, if He is to be our life, the food of our souls, passing

into us, and becoming a part of ourselves, it is to be by the appropriation of His sacrificed life.

It was an amazing utterance, an utterance amazing, to us now as we read, to those who heard it, as the record tells us, a staggering utterance. It caused a critical division among the disciples. The advent of the Jews of Jerusalem in Galilee has broken in upon the ministry in Galilee. Their protest against the new life coming down from heaven has drawn forth a deeper revelation of the nature of the need of the appropriated life of the Son, and of what must be done to meet it. And this new revelation has caused a split in His following. He feels that it is shaking the allegiance even of the inner body of the twelve: "Will ye also go away?" St. Peter's loyal answer still does not profess that he understands the new doctrine. Only he will follow blind. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." He carries the rest with Him—all but one. From this moment there is one in the company who holds aloof, one—the seed of evil is already there—one who will be the traitor.

What, then, is this new teaching, in which, in the atmosphere of the imperfect faith of Galilee, the unbelief of Jerusalem has landed us? What is this principle, the utterance of which our Lord allows to split off a large proportion of His followers, and to shake even the twelve?

It is not directly sacramental teaching, though it necessarily becomes so afterwards in its application, in its embodiment in an ordinance. As the talk with Nicodemus gives us the underlying principle of Baptism, so here we have the underlying principle of the Eucharist.

The teaching is twofold. The first stage is given in the discourse with the Galileans. The need of the soul of man is the appropriation of the life of the Son—to take His life into ourselves and to make it our life, that in and through Him we may have that living communion with the Father which is life.

But this step is no sooner taken than the intervention of the Jews drives Him to a further revelation, not as though it were altogether distinct from that already given, but as though it were the revelation of another element in truth already revealed, and this further revelation is, as we have said, that the appropriation of the life of the Son will be the appropriation of His sacrificed life.

Why is the thought of the sacrifice of the Son introduced thus abruptly at this point?

In the Synoptic story our Lord begins to prepare His disciples for His Passion from the moment when the decisive recognition of Him as the Messiah has been expressed under

circumstances which give the recognition its full value.* And in St. Luke's Gospel this preparation for the Passion, this "steadfastly setting His face to go to Jerusalem," gives its character to the whole of the latter part of the record of the ministry. But in the Synoptic records the idea of sacrifice is only introduced once before the institution of the new Passover, and it is introduced, as it were, incidentally. It is in the record of St. Mark. The Evangelist has described in a sentence what St. Luke has spread through many chapters. If we accept Dr. Turner's illuminating suggestion, we should read St. Mark x. 32, "And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus was going before them, and He was amazed, and they that followed were afraid." And then follows one of the repeated foretellings of the Passion, and then the request of the sons of Zebedee to sit on His right hand and on His left in His kingdom. And it is after rebuking the jealous resentment of the ten at this request that He adds, "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." The indication of the sacrificial character of His death is given here alone in the Synoptic writers before the institution of the Eucharist, and it is given as in the present passage incidentally.

But at the Passover of the feeding of the five thousand we have not yet reached the period when He began to foretell His Passion to His disciples. Can we find any reason in the context of the story in the Fourth Gospel why the thought of sacrifice should force itself upon His mind at this moment, and find, as it does here, repeated and emphatic expression?

The only answer to this question is to be found in the circumstances which we have already noted. If the passage in St. Mark x. 33, and the language of the institution of the Eucharist, together with the record of the conversation with the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, and of the teaching of Philip to the eunuch, leave us no choice but to suppose that our Lord's own mind had absorbed and adopted the thoughts of Isaiah liii., if such thoughts, with all their implications, were already in His mind, we can well understand how they would rise to the surface and find expression, not only on an occasion like St. Mark x. 33, to carry home a spiritual lesson, but at a moment when His death loomed before Him through the failure of His mission.

And the story of the Fourth Gospel at this point shows that the failure of His mission was being made very strikingly evident.

* *Cf.* Stanton, *Gospels as Historical Documents*, pt. iii., p. 226. *Gospel of the Rejection*, pp. 80, 81.

"Labour not for the meat that perisheth" sums up His sense of the failure to raise any general spiritual response to His teaching in Galilee. Hence His anxiety to remove His disciples, not only from the danger of the leaven of the Pharisees, but also from the danger of the contagious enthusiasm of the multitudes, intent on taking Him by force to make Him a King. How alien this enthusiasm was from His own conception of the Messiahship we may appreciate if we reflect that the foretelling of the Passion, which burst forth when the confession of St. Peter had recognized Him as the Messiah in the moment of His humiliation as a rejected Prophet, must have been already the dominant thought in His own anticipation of the future.

And at this moment in the story of the Fourth Gospel this recognition of the essential failure in Galilee is immediately followed by a reminder of the impenetrable temper of Jerusalem. The conflict with this invincibly alien spirit is inevitable. It means that the claim which is inseparable from His offer of life will be in the eyes of Jerusalem blasphemous, and will be punished with death—death, which can only be inflicted through His being delivered to the Romans.

Two elements, then, in the gospel of life have emerged at this point, on the occasion of the manifestation of the hostility of the Jews at Jerusalem to His Divine origin, two elements which, in the Christian consciousness, have been so fused into one that it is difficult to separate them from one another, even so far as to distinguish them from one another. One is the principle that life, the living communion with the Father, is fed and maintained by the appropriation of the life of the Son, and by the surrender of faith, the surrender of the soul to Him to be our life. The other is the principle that the life which we appropriate and take to be our own is the sacrificed life, the life of one who surrenders His life to be the means of the living communion between the soul of man and God.

Is this combination, the rapid transition from one to the other, matter for surprise? After all, the Jew is only religious man. The phenomena of our Lord's manifestation to the Jews are simply the phenomena of His manifestation to humanity. Our Lord shows signs enough that His vision had a scope far beyond the bounds of Judaism. His conscious and deliberate restriction of His activity within these limits showed that He had. During the long years of waiting and preparation for His ministry, He must needs have faced the fact, so familiar to the Christian generations—familiar, indeed, to the Jew, and pervading the religious consciousness of mankind—that for man as he is, blinded, perverted, incapacitated

by deep-rooted sin, there can be no approach to God but through sacrifice. It is to meet this need of man that, at this moment in the story of the ministry, when the incapacitating power of sin becomes manifested in Galilee and Jerusalem alike, our Lord gives utterance to the necessity, that the Son should give through sacrifice the communion with the Father which is life.

The function of sacrifice in the life-giving ministry of the Son is not here expanded or explained. We are left face to face with the human experience of Him who came to give life to the world, that the communion with God, which is life, and is manifest in the Son, is to man, to whom in the Son it is offered, far away out of his reach, and that only through some mysterious taking on himself of the burden of mankind can he lift humanity up to the level of communion with God. The appeal of sacrifice to the heart of man appears in this Gospel in the repeated allusion to the lifting up of the Son of man. The place of sacrifice in the revelation of the love in which the Father and the Son are one will appear at a later stage. Here we have only the teaching that it is by becoming partakers of the sacrificed life that we live in that communion with God which is life.

WILFRID RICHMOND.

THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERY

II

WE have given as sympathetic an account as possible of the theory that primitive Christianity was a mystery religion which happened to survive. And, on the assumption that this theory is true, we have traced the ancestry of the sacramental element in Christianity from very humble origins indeed. It began, if this account of it is valid, in Athens, on a level where the line between magic and religion is very difficult to draw. A bull was slain and eaten that the worshippers might share in the divine energy of the bull god Dionysos; the skin was stuffed and set up on its legs, and yoked to a plough in order that the divine life might make the harvest grow. It passes by insensible changes to a level where people sacrifice pigs and bathe in the sea, in order to remove taboos, and then join in ceremonies through which they are united to the deity whose immortality sustains the life of all things. Ceremonial is very conservative; it remains unchanged; it is of divine appointment; but interpretations change, they become

gradually less materialistic, more mystical, less magical, more personal. It now deserves to be called religion, of a sort. It begins to be concerned with immortality. But the birth of morality is not yet. It is still nature worship—worthy of respect, because it means reverence for the mystery of life. Ecstasy and love were part of religion then, and they have remained. It is mixed, however, with what a later age calls squalid and indecent. Ribaldry and noise are part of public worship. But immortality is a hope too mighty not to reinforce the spirit against the body. And the thought of holiness, of purity of mind, appears. Personal holiness was introduced into Gentile religion by the mysteries. The religion of Orpheus re-interprets the old ceremonial. It does not reject the old. There are still the rites which must be observed, though the race has forgotten their origin and their first meaning; the words that must be said, though they have become meaningless, and new, far-fetched, interpretations have to be imposed on them; the precise, formal, ceremonial that has to be carried out in all its dry detail. The daubing with white clay, the eating of raw bulls—it still goes on. The rationalist, the outsider, mock, but it is the command of the god. It is the outward and visible sign; and now it means self-control, a reverence for all that lives, a high standard of moral conduct, a hope of eternity that is at once reasonable because it is ethical, and enthusiastic, spiritual, because it springs from religious fellowship with the divine. And then we become aware that in other places also—in Egypt, in Syria, in Persia, in Asia Minor, not altogether independently, but not mere imitations—similar forms of worship, having the same fundamental purpose and using similar methods, have been meeting in other races the same deep human needs—the longing for fellowship with the divine,* the craving for deliverance from sin and death, the obstinate conviction that the material and physical has a meaning, and that it means spirit. And because these religions meet a need so universal they spread through the world—they make their appeal *urbi et orbi*—and religion becomes something more than family piety or state loyalty—it picks men out, and makes them individuals, lifts them to be partakers of the divine nature. The worshippers of Zagreus ate the body of the god and drank his blood. Mithraism appealed to the thoughtful by its philosophy, and to the good by its ethics. It was no unworthy religion that won the allegiance of Julian. It taught reverence, and self-sacrifice, and loyalty. It was a religion for heroes. It bound men by great vows, it gave them fellowship in a

* The name "Mithra" means "friend."

consecrated meal. It was a good religion, but it was supplanted by a better. All other mysteries disappeared before Christianity. This can only mean that it satisfied the needs that they had quickened. The Eucharist became, supremely, "These Holy Mysteries." It remains to discuss the kind of sacramental theology which is possible, if the theory we have outlined be true.

Any theory or explanation of the Christian sacraments, of their relation to faith as a means of Grace, if it is to do justice to this development and to the teaching of the New Testament, must fulfil certain conditions. It must make it clear that sacraments are a condition, a cause, a means of Grace, but it must interpret the sacraments in such a way as to relate them to faith. The sacrament cannot produce salvation of itself, apart from faith. It is not magic, but mystery. Here the difficult sacrament to understand is Infant Baptism. In some Anglo-Catholic circles the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration has been made much too definite since the Gorham Judgment. It is well to remember that Pusey, out of his vast learning, refused to say that Mr. Gorham was a heretic. In the light of modern psychology, how should the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration be stated so as to make it possible to explain to an intelligent person why Infant Baptism is important?

More generally, a satisfactory theology of the sacraments must make it *reasonable* that the moral and spiritual should be linked up with the material, as they are in the sacraments. In many ways, of course, the spiritual needs the material. There is, in this present world of time and space, no life without matter. Matter is the channel, the opportunity, the means-of-expression of the spirit. I can only express myself—even to other spirits—by means of matter. I can only get my way in the world—realize my desires, do my will—by means of matter. But in a sacrament—especially in so far as we emphasize the necessity of sacraments to salvation—the spirit is dependent on matter in a different way to that. It almost seems as though the *initiative*, so to speak, rests with the lower. The material comes first, it is there, it is logically prior—and the meaning—the "inward and spiritual grace"—follows. Perhaps the most illuminating parallel here is the begetting and birth of a human being. That spiritual personality, with its manifold powers, should develop in, and come to self-consciousness through, a body which has grown by physical processes from a fertilized ovum, that the human should depend upon the natural, the spiritual on the biological in this way—this may not *explain* the sacramental, but it is

an entirely parallel mystery. Marriage is certainly a physical relation. It ought to be a spiritual relation also, but whether it is so or not, it produces spiritual results. That is what we mean when we speak of the catholic doctrine of the sacraments. A similar illustration from science will help us to understand the light that is thrown on the sacramental principle by the connection I have suggested between the pagan mysteries and primitive Christianity.

Any philosophy which has come to terms with modern science must describe the universe in terms of evolution. In the thoroughgoing form in which that theory appears in such recent books as the two latest volumes of Gifford Lectures, Professor Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution* and Dr. E. W. Hobson's *The Domain of Natural Science*, the *description* of how the universe came to be is given in purely naturalistic terms, without any assumed "intervention" or special activity, either of God or of a vital force, to make possible the appearance of the higher and the new from the lower and the old, but the way is left clear for an *explanation* of the process in terms of purpose or grace. There is a place left for theism, in other words, as an explanation of what science describes as a purely natural process. The modern type of evolutionists admit the reality of progress. They recognize—in fact, they emphasize—the appearance of something really new and unpredictable at more than one stage of the evolutionary process. They do not assume a special activity of God to explain these new appearances. They say that if we acknowledge divine activity at all it must be conceived as omnipresent, and manifested at every point and in every happening of the whole course. They merely accept these new relations, when they appear, "with natural piety," to use Mr. Alexander's phrase. They point out that all the processes which take place in a living organism can be explained as physico-chemical processes, without assuming any different or new forces to be acting, and yet that in a living organism the way in which these chemical and physical events run their course is different to what it would be if life were not present. Similarly, when an animal becomes "conscious," the biological processes—the action of heart and lungs and the digestive organs, for example—are not transformed; they achieve the same results by the same methods as before. And yet the behaviour of a conscious organism is different to what it would be if consciousness were not present. And similar things can be said about conscience when, at a later stage, it appears. It seems as though it were possible to describe these new gains or gifts in the process of evolution as a new direction, a new quality, or a new relation,

uniting, lifting on to a new level, giving new meaning to, what was present before. Professor Lloyd Morgan has used an illustration from Robert Browning with great effect. It comes from *Abt Vogler:*

> "And I know not if, save in this, such gift he allowed to man
> That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star."

The poet emphasizes the fact that what follows when we add three sounds together is more than merely the addition of the sounds. They are still there, of course—but the product is something genuinely new—a new creation. So in a living organism, everything present can be analyzed into ordinary inorganic substances—carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and so on. They are all really there, and nothing else. And all that happens in a living organism can be described in terms of physics and dynamics—the conservation and dissipation of energy, the laws of thermo-dynamics. And yet life is more than chemistry. There is a new creation—"not a fourth sound, but a star." It all has a new meaning, a new direction, now, a higher quality, a relation quite impossible to predict until it had appeared. And the same description—accepting with reverent agnosticism the appearance of the new, but recognizing this new as an unpredictable "quality" or "relation" of what had been in existence before—can be given of each new step forward and upward. There is continuity in the progress, and progress in the continuity. What emerges is dependent on what existed before, and raises that previous existence to a higher level, and gives it richer meaning. The religious consciousness claims, and rightly, that the explanation of the whole process is divine and supernatural. It is irrational unless it is from God, and in God, and unto God. But the method by which God works is what science calls Nature.

This is the clue to the progress from magic to Holy Mass. First of all there was the thing done in order to constrain the deity to make the crops grow. Then there is the drama of the life of the deity, showing man the way he must go to escape an evil fate. Then a sacramental union with the god as the assurance of immortality. Then a pure heart because one has been initiated, and the effort after perfection is the real justification for immortality. And then a growing sense of sin, and a clearer recognition of sacramental means for deliverance from it. Cults which sought to meet needs which were not local or racial, but human, spread over the earth, until at last the reality appeared of which these were the prophecy and the shadow; they had been waiting for this, and

disappeared before it. The essential thing to notice is again the continuity in progress, and the progress is continuity. Religions—actual living religions which have existence in real life—do not progress by destroying the past. Ceremonial must be old, otherwise it can make no appeal to those instinctive elements in man's nature which are the soil in which faith grows. The progress was a progress in interpretation, the "things done"—the words said—in public worship, changed very slowly. And yet what looks childish and obsolete, fantastic and unworthy, barbarous and disgusting, comes to have meaning and implications which put it in a circle of ideals and inspirations and sanctions, which make it a not unworthy rival of Christianity. External religion is always a canonization of the past; and not of the immediate past, but of a past so far removed that it consecrates the present, and is consecrated for the present. And yet external religion always looks towards the future—perhaps because man's sense of imperfection makes him find in his worship an ideal meaning—an ideal which is not yet, but is to be. We cling to the Apostolical Succession—an external thing, after all—and part of the reason is that it shall provoke the priests of the Church to be Apostolic men, lest they forget that Christ cannot work through any other. We offer the sacrifice of the Mass, with such outward glory and beauty and dignity as we can achieve, with external adjuncts that link us with the immemorial past—in part, at least, in order that we dare not leave all this outward form a mere form, but shall identify ourselves in spirit and in life with the Christ who is offered, and offer ourselves to the Father for the service of the brotherhood, as Christ did and does. The external induces the inward; the ceremonial is the opportunity for the moral, the body prepared for it; cult is justified in conduct; external religion is always a symbol of the life of charity, or it is nothing; the lamp in which glows the love of God and of His children. The higher depends upon the lower, and justifies it. This is the sacramental principle.

This strange warring fellowship between the outward and visible sign and its inward and spiritual meaning, the former old, formal, præ-rational, touching the subconscious side of our personality, the latter forward-looking, indefinable, appealing to and *reaching beyond* the most reasonable, the most ethical, the most spiritual, the latest hardly-acquired higher principles in us—this diversity in unity which makes a sacrament, does quite definitely challenge all Christians, and in particular Christian theologians and teachers, resolutely to put always the highest conceivable, the most personal, interpretation on

sacramental grace. In much of our ordinary speech, in not a little of the phraseology of our prayers, grace seems to be interpreted somewhat after the analogy of water pumped into a bucket, or of the electricity with which an accumulator is charged. But the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, especially as we see it in the Master's own relation to His disciples and friends, forbids us to think of grace in any way which would seem to threaten man's complete freedom. However we describe it, it must be a relation between Persons.

The New Testament makes two distinctions between Grace and the Law which help us to give a definite meaning to the former word. St. John tells us that the law was given by Moses, but grace came by Jesus Christ. If we contrast the religious attitude of Jewish legalism with that of the Lord Jesus, we shall see something of what this means. The Pharisees seem to have thought of God primarily as a Law-giver and Judge. The way to please Him was to keep certain definite laws which He had laid down. Conduct, even in its minute details, was regulated by explicit commands, or by canonistical deductions from such commands. Life became a careful construction, with little opportunity for initiative, no place for freedom, and only the vaguest excuse for joy. The very foundations of morality were threatened, for when life is regulated by external commands, and the sanctions of these commands are retributive, it is almost impossible for a man to seek good for its own sake. But Jesus Christ, on the other hand, called God "Father," and taught men to do so. He walked the path of life with glad, free confidence, as a Son in His Father's spacious lands. He summed up the whole duty of man in "Love"—love your Father, and love His other children—which is not really more easy than the Jewish way, but which is so inward that it shuts a man up to freedom, and makes him his own judge in the sight of God, and leads him straight into the humility that recognizes that love—because it is love—has the right to make infinite demands of us, to expect perfection of us; and into the confidence that love will never fail those who trust it enough to obey. Again, St. Paul reminds his readers that they are saved by grace, not by the works of the law. Whatever salvation may mean of the freedom which is perfect service, of the sharing of the spontaneous self-giving which is the life of God, comes to us not because we have earned it, not because we have deserved it, but of God's free gift—it is gratuitous—given to us because He loves us, accepted by us because it is love's gift, and the opportunity and power for us to give ourselves gladly for love's sake. Grace means the atmosphere of the family.

God helping us, expecting much of us, because we are His children; we, trusting Him—" through sorrow and through sinning "—in humility doing our best gladly for His sake, because He is our Father. So " grace " comes to have about it a suggestion of a goodness which is beautiful because it is natural and unconstrained and generous—a suggestion crystallized in the word " graceful." And to " grow in grace " means to grow in the assurance that we are members of this family—to grow in eagerness, in aptitude, in the knack of doing the loving thing because we love to do it—for Christ's sake.

So when we speak of " sacramental grace " our words are on this level.* It is a gift of God, of course. And when you are on the level of personal love, the only gift that one person can give another is himself, his friendship, his companionship. The only gift that you can give to God is, quite obviously, yourself. And the only gift that God can give you is Himself. It is true that we ask for other gifts—we pray for courage, for purity, for strength. But courage is not a substance which can be weighed out to a man. The only way in which you can get courage from another is through the companionship of that other—if he himself is brave. So when we pray for courage or for innocence from Christ—we are asking, whether we realize it or not, for the companionship of the brave and innocent Christ, that He, giving us Himself, may make us again after His pattern. Under all the symbols that the New Testament uses to describe Christ's gift to us—whether it speaks of the living water, or His Grace, or His Body and Blood, there is this truth conveyed—He gives us His companionship, His Friendship—He gives us Himself.

It is an elementary truth about friendship that it must have external, visible, means of expression. A friend gives presents to his friend, invites him to stay with him, goes for walks with him, writes letters to him, has him in to supper, and so on. There are, indeed, unique individuals who profess that they can do without such external expressions; that after three or four years they can take up a friendship just where it left off. Such people are few, and there is always the probability that the other party to the friendship may not be one of them also. In three years he grows away from his friend, forms new interests, develops new powers, is moulded by strange experiences, becomes a different man. A normal friendship *depends on* external means. And the same is true of the friendship between God and the soul. It is a simple, homely,

* This, and the next, paragraph I owe to a sermon by the Rev. A. E. M. Glover, Vicar of St. Olave's, York.

but not altogether inadequate way to think of the sacraments that they are the external means upon which my friendship with God depends for its sustenance and expression. The mark of such things is that they are often of little meaning *in themselves*—matters of convention and custom—the connection between the outward sign and the inner love is arbitrary So it is, it may be said with all reverence, of the sacraments—of some of them at least. There is no *natural* connection between outward and inner—the connection is " positive "—it is of Christ's appointment—they mean nothing unless they mean the grace of God. And as it is true that an outward sign of friendship—a handshake or a kiss or a letter—if it is not the expression of friendship, tends to alienate another rather than to attract, so the deadly peril of all external religion is that, if it is not the mystic symbol of obedience and grace, it will break the bruised reed and quench the smoking flax, and destroy what little religion we have.

What light does all this throw on the theory, the theology, of Infant Baptism? Grace, to repeat what has been said above, means the relationship whose most adequate symbol is the family—God helping us, expecting much of us, claiming us, because we are His children; we trusting Him, doing our best gladly for His sake, because He is our Father. Grace is the bond of the family of God. And that family is the Church. Every parish priest knows that there would have been no theoretical difficulty about Infant Baptism, no question would ever have been asked, if the Christian fellowship of the Church, and of its congregations, had been a reality indubitable, all-inclusive, touching the life of each member at all its points. If the baptism of an infant were, not only metaphysically, but also practically, an initiation of the child into a spiritual family, and the family, and the individual members of it, becoming aware of the child, assuming responsibility for the child, it would never have seemed inconceivable that the baptism also meant a new gracious relation between God and the child. Ultimate spiritual realities are doubted because we do not see them translated into human relationships. So we are compelled to fall back on the interpretation of a sacrament in terms of the external inducing the inward, the ceremonial being the opportunity for the moral, the outward act being a mystical symbol of the life of charity, the lower finding its justification in the higher; and to remind ourselves that the only escape from the most unsatisfying pragmatism is to believe that these things must mean that in baptism, through baptism, the child becomes a child " of God " in a sense which was not true before. This is the theological

ground of the appeal which we make to Christians to carry out the obligations of their baptism.

The most general condition that any theory of the sacraments must satisfy is that they must be shown to be a manifestation in a particular instance of a principle that runs right through the universe, and not something unique, bearing no relationship or analogy to the rest of existence. God's revelation of Himself in nature, in history, in the Hebrew prophets, in the religion and philosophy of the Gentiles, seems to be all of a piece, manifold in its richness and depth, but the revelation of one Being. Love is its meaning, generous, difficult, costly, glorious. Love is its method, infinitely patient, humbling itself to the level at which men can see It and grasp It, tempering the wind to the back of the shorn lamb. In the long process of evolution, first that which is natural, then that which is spiritual. In the development of human religion, first that which is magical, then that which is personal. In the sacramental system of the Church—the things that are made the channel, the provocation, the condition, the open gate to the invisible things of God. It all means love.

A. E. Baker.

THE PRIEST

The Laity are the Matter, no dead Matter, but the living Substance of the Church, for which it exists, with which we are all concerned. The Parish provides the system under which the priests carry out the larger part of their work of ministering. Plainly, our first need is to understand our material, and what kind of help it requires. I have tried to show (i.) what our difficulties are in understanding the laity; (ii.) that these difficulties are very largely due, not to the parochial system itself, but rather to the ideas by which we explain it, and in practice use it. We come now, (iii.), to the question of the clergy. What is our true relation to the religious life of the laity? How ought we to understand the parish system? What other ideas are there than those we have commonly assumed?

I

I think we can get something of what we want if we consider certain terms. I take first those which go with the word "Church." With us it stands for a very vital theological conception, but I have pointed out that the Church has very largely ceased to be a practical system. It is now only

struggling to come back. Every priest in his parish is his own denomination.

Here are three significant words—a party, a denomination, a Church. A party is a group of people who agree about certain ideas and practices, and act together in pressing their importance. A denomination is a group of people similarly minded, organized as a body on a certain set of ideas, taken as sufficient for their spiritual life. The Church, on the other hand, is a " real " society—like a family or nation. Like them, she has a faith and practice, but her being does not rest upon agreement in opinion. It begins from a unity, fore-established in the Divine Purpose, and realized in faith. Learning together, worshipping together, men develop something of a common mind. Yet the teaching of the Church, that which we accept implicitly, is a universal whole, infinite with the infinity of the Wisdom of God; her compass is of minds infinitely varied.

Parties, as we all know, are very dangerous. Yet it is both inevitable and right that men should act together for what they believe. Parties are at the same time a mischievous intensification, and a correction, of the evils of individualism. Denominations, I make bold to say, are always evil things, since no set of ideas held in any human mind is, or can be, adequate to the spiritual life even of one soul. Nor is it ever right that such sets of ideas should be isolated as the private stock of an association.

Our concern, therefore, is with the Church before everything;

(1) as regards the priest himself, for he has no other status than that of an official of the Church. No doubt he has his own gifts—his personal abilities, his own vision, what God has given him to see—and these are, in one sense, his power. On the other hand, they mark his weakness. All mankind, all created things, are bound by the Law of Limitation. Each gift of God is this gift by distinction from that; and each power is compensated by its own defect. God has made us, not for perfection, but for penitence; not for power, but for humility; in littleness rather than in greatness, because He has made us for love and help.

No existent Church, neither England, nor Russia, nor Rome, can be truly Catholic. Even the whole Church throughout the world does not include the Church of the centuries to come, and without them we are not made " perfect." Only the Spirit of God is Universal, as also Eternal. By Faith, by looking to Him, by consciousness of our limitation, by patience and teachableness only, we, Churches and individuals, are made in some degree partakers of His grace, the heirs, rather than the actual possessors, of infinite and Catholic Truth.

(2) I ought, perhaps, to apologize for this sermon and its well-worn platitudes, but this inner conviction of the priest must lead up to the text of my proper subject which is the priest's work.

Now I have tried to point out before that, while the ideas, originalities, departures, of the individual priest mean a great deal to the specially religious group which follows him, the normal laity are very "Anglican"; they are more swayed by the ideas common to the Church as a whole, and are inclined to regard the personal peculiarities of their vicar as something of a freak. In their own affairs, the colonel or the manager has his own abilities and his own ways, but his first business is to maintain the tradition of the army or of the firm. There is no need to pass judgment on all those circumstances in the past which have led, pushed, or tempted us into our present system of isolated independence. God justifies Himself. At whatever cost, a wonderful development and energy of Church life have grown up in this way, but I believe we all feel that it is high time we got back something more of a common mind.

We might well acquiesce in the legal freehold, if we could learn a more moderate use of the mental freehold. The ideal of building up separate congregations of the "faithful" is, in the main, an illusion.

I hope I am not too much of an optimist, but so far as I can trust my ignorance, the work done by the National Assembly and other efforts in building up a real Church feeling is amazing. Charity, however, begins at home, and home, for this purpose, is the parish. It is, I believe, agreed among observers that a true constitutional freedom cannot be created from above by a central parliament. It must have its roots in local self-government.

So far I have spoken of certain principles and their results. I am afraid to put forward any practical proposal, because critics, far more competent than myself, are apt to fix on it as the one thing for which all else has been said. Now while the principles seem to me clear and important, I offer one suggestion for what it is worth, rather as an illustration than as maintaining that it is the only or the best way of realizing those principles.

Theologically, in ecclesiastical theory, the proper unit of Church life should be, of course, the Diocese, but the Diocesan Synod numbers several hundred clergy. It can only meet very rarely, by careful arrangement of times and business, for the decision of weighty matters, which are a little remote from our parish life. A common mind must be assumed at such

meetings; for it is hardly formed where reporters listen to commit us in public.

As things stand, our first real unit is the Rural Deanery, for the clergy are neighbours and neighbourly. They can meet easily, and it should be quite possible for them to discuss all their own affairs, difficulties, and plans, and to form that common " Church " mind on which common action can rest.

I admit that at the present day we are all so much more anxious to persuade and convince than to learn from, sympathize with, help, men different from ourselves, that our most important questions could not be brought up profitably at a common meeting. But surely this is rather a confession of the things we have left undone than a reason why something should not be done. I am not proposing that everything the vicar wants to do in his own parish should await the decision of an R.D. Chapter. We think altogether too much of decisions and the votes which we take with us, too little of the weightier matters of the law, of patience, consideration, sympathy, with the ideals, aims, efforts, of others, and the value of a common understanding.

No doubt the vicar must in the end decide his own questions for his own parish. But is it ever right for him to decide without consideration, consultation, explanation, with his brothers? We do think how our plans will affect our own people; ought we not also to think how it will affect those around us—for they will be affected? Are we not thinking more of the semi-denominationalism of our party than of the duties of Christian fellowship? We have strayed, so far from the very ideal of the common mind, that in many rural deaneries it will take a long time to get back. Yet there are places where some such unity is already a fact.

II

All human life is bound under the Law of Limitation, which is a Law of Inadequacy. I have tried to show how this applies to our relation towards the Church, and especially towards the Catholic Church of the odd dozen or two of the parishes nearest.

But when all is said, with whatever help and confidence the priest can acquire from the sympathy of his own brethren, he must still come home to his own people, and meet the same law in another and yet more difficult shape, for the world of limitation, as God has made it, is a world of infinite diversity. It is so in the infinite variety of its individual characters; it is so in the infinite variety of its callings, of which the priesthood

is only one. Priesthood is a very high calling. In one sense it is a very wide calling, since it touches life at all points; yet it is also a very narrow calling, since it touches life only in its own way, which the Church has somewhat jealously fenced round.

There are clergy who, resenting this separation, have tried to maintain a quasi-lay outlook; but this is utterly false to the principle of diversity. There is a peculiar glory in the lay calling; there are also weaknesses which we are sent to supply. We cannot share its glory, but we can repeat and caricature its weakness. We are only priests, clergy, parsons—there is a real helpfulness in derogatory words. We must be content to wait on our parsoning.

The Law of Limitation, inadequacy, insufficiency, is the Law of Service and Help. For this you must get a carpenter, and for that an electrician: here you want a lawyer, and now a doctor. But there are differences. I leave my boots to the cobbler, and, more rarely, my business to a lawyer. I can give my body to a doctor when there is something seriously wrong. I cannot leave my soul to anyone.

This last principle, that each man must in the end answer for his own soul, marks the limitation of the priest's work. I have been throughout wrestling with a certain saying: "The laity are dependent upon the clergy." Like most dogmatic propositions, it has a suggestion, but no certain meaning, apart from its context. In regard to the parish, I think it has had a very misleading suggestion, but it calls for very serious consideration. The priest's work is described as the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments. To the Sacraments belongs the formal ministry of his acts; to the Word, his personal influence in preaching, teaching, guiding.

As priests we are faced with two barriers, created by the differences of individuals and the differences of callings. Perhaps none but a priest can fully appreciate how the individuality of the soul is at once the most sacred of mysteries, and yet the root of all sin, the very meaning of Original Sin. The boy comes to Confession, shrinking at the sins, the like of which the world has never seen. And it is so. Our wisdom is something we have learnt; our achievements something we have helped in doing for God and man. The boy's sins only are just his own, written for ever in the Book of Dooms; sins which none ever committed before, which will never be committed again. Yet the poor child has only done what boys are always doing.

It is the first work of a priest to bring men out of what is their own into that which is common. It may, must, be, in

part, a matter of teaching, but it is in effect a matter of administration, a sprinkling of the Blood once shed, transfiguring the sordidness of sin committed into the miracle of sin forgiven, bringing the soul from the isolation of itself into the communion, the commonness, of the Body of Christ. Of salvation, the first necessity is to hold the Catholic, the common, Faith, and that is nothing other than a worship of one God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

This sacramental side of our ministry constitutes a round of duties, clearly marked out. The very words we are to say the Church has put in our mouths, and, just where there is least choice of ours, the laity can be said to be most dependent upon their priests. But our minds are quite naturally more taken up with the ministry of the Word, with teaching and direct personal influence, where each of us must make his way as he can. It is in this sphere that we have to meet not only the differences of the individual, but the difference of the lay calling. If these differences are the very ground of our service—as it seems to me of faith to believe—they are no less the cause of a difficulty—the cause of that all too common discouragement to which I referred above.

I think we might learn from our very good friends the doctors. Their professional duties are simpler than ours. Perhaps for that reason they have worked out a much more precise notion of the proper professional attitude. And I have been a good deal impressed with the doctor's use of the word *normal*. When we were young, our minds were set on the supernormal—on strength and "fitness." As we get into middle life, we come round to the doctor's view. If what St. Francis called "Brother Ass" will jog through his day's work without giving trouble, we shall be well content.

Now in our profession we have to deal with all three classes. There are the subnormal, or pathological, cases. We have a good deal to do with the supernormal, who run to us as the young would-be athlete runs to his trainer. They may not be very athletic, but they are the class of the devotionally keen, and we must do our best, where we can, to lead them on to a higher life, and, not less, to keep them off worshipping their own religiousness. We are troubled over the pathological cases, but our main anxiety is over the normal man. Is he making the best of himself, and what pathological conditions may not that smooth surface cover?

In the medical profession, the doctor's status depends upon his being "called in." It is unprofessional to give unasked advice. Our position is somewhat different. People in general seem less inclined to ask help for their souls than

for their bodies, less able to know when help is wanted. It may be also a duty to warn men when they do not want to listen. Yet there is the same fundamental principle—the man's soul is his own. It is our business to help, not to dictate. There are the same fundamental distinctions between the people we can help and the people we cannot; between the times when help is needed and is possible, and the times when it is not.

Nothing troubles our conscience like the memory of a lost opportunity—when we might have spoken, and did not. Is it more than the instinct of self-justification, that we think so much less about the assertiveness, the insistences, the arguments, which were not, could not have been, of service ?

At the last day I do not think we shall be asked what we have done for our people—at least I, for one, hope not. I imagine that we shall be asked only if we have loved them. And while love is born in service, it is only perfected in renunciation. The mother's care for her children is too much an enjoyment, a self-fulfilment. The wonder of it is shown when she lets the child go—as go it must and will—to school, to the world, to marriage; and the mother finds room to rejoice in a life which is no longer hers.

And the Law of Love is based on the Law of Faith in God, for without Faith, Love has no assurance of solid meaning. In this life there are many friends and much comradeship, yet each lives his own life, in substance, alone with God. Each soul is in His hands, taught by God, led by Him, along ways God has for him chosen. This is the very front of our teaching, and that men may believe it—no easy thing to believe—we must be sure we believe ourselves, with all the limitation it implies in our own activity. In some respects it is one of the mysteries of life how little people understand themselves, how often it seems that everyone can see the truth of what a man is doing except the man most concerned. No doubt we ourselves can see other people's weaknesses when we cannot see our own. Yet all these outside judgments, however true, are a very small part of that whole effort, temptation, sorrow, joy, which makes a life, and which is known only to him who lives it.

It is the same with the difference of calling. One man counts money; another loads of goods. One man measures fields; another the courses of the stars. Each has his own skill, uninterchangeable, for the accountant may be puzzled at acreage, and the astronomer not at home in truckloads. Yet arithmetic is common, same, true, for all—like the Creeds and the Catholic Faith—a bond of unity under all difference.

God is a good tutor. Much of His teaching is given in classes—which we at times may take as His undermasters—but each pupil must learn as he can, and will make his own use of what he can learn according to the fashion of his own life. The last examination will depend, not on what the student has been taught to repeat, but on what he has learnt to use.

"That which thou sowest does not come to life except it die, and thou sowest not that body which shall be, but God giveth it a body as it has pleased Him"—there is the law of all teaching. There are warehouse minds, capable of storing, and on demand reproducing, other folk's ideas, but there are no warehouse souls. Minds, souls, convictions, are not in reality built up of the separate bricks which we and others have contributed, and suitably inscribed. They grow, as the plants grow, by the process of their own inner life, assimilating what it is capable of taking up into the structure of its own very different tissues.

I have never had the ability to be a missionary, but I have been in foreign lands, and—perhaps the more easily to a somewhat exceptional incapacity—"I am only a foreigner" seemed to me a sort of key to men's hearts, as "I am only a parson" may be at times a key to the layman's heart. For the native born is as well aware that you are only a foreigner, as the layman is well aware that you are only a parson. If you will frankly say so, honestly realizing that the questions which God has put before him it is for him and not for you to answer, the weapons of a too possible antagonism are knocked out of his hands, and he will be glad enough of any light you can give him for seeing his way.

I am not, of course, suggesting that truth and error, right and wrong, are different as between one man and another, but, so far as I can judge from the memory of many failures, errors, stupidities, there are three notions by which we are specially drawn aside.

(i.) Perhaps it is the fashion of our lives which brings things before us in the shape of "points." The Deity of our Lord—the reality of the sacramental gift—plain honesty in business—we have been over them so often, and our mind moves swiftly to a categorical answer.

But in a layman's mouth such questions are merely the surface ripples of a far deeper disturbance. Does God mean anything more than a presumed cause of things? Can He come to us? Does He? What does the ordering of life itself mean? And whatever the question, it is the layman who has to give answer with his inmost soul, not only with his lips. To coach him in correct replies is, as nearly as

possible, just nothing at all; to help him to a position where he can see what answer is alone right, is just everything. We have to give people bread they can eat, not a stone they can put in their pockets.

(ii.) If we take questions as simple issues, we conceive of ourselves as convincing or persuading people of the correct answers, yet we know that in things that really matter, we ourselves are never convinced by anything but our own vision.

Worsted in argument, a man (as we should) starts looking for new and better arguments. Once you have said, or allowed the other man to say, "there you and I differ," he will go on trying to justify his difference, and that is fatal. For the layman, as for ourselves, the first condition of learning anything is a realization that there is something worth learning, other than he, or we, already possess, and the second condition is the consequent desire to get hold of it.

(iii.) A very real stumbling-block is a false sense of duty. "Liberavi meam animam—Sir, it is my business to give you reasons, not to give you the brains to understand them:—I have done my duty." These, so near to us, are the comfort of self-satisfaction, not the guides of duty. About our duty the Church is quite clear. You must plead to God for your people in prayer; you shall speak to your people for God in these Lessons and other forms. Here are the words you shall use reverently, carefully, intelligibly, without varying or shirking. For the rest, "you shall do all that in you lies to bring all to faith, knowledge, ripeness, and perfectness." And to "bring" people there is no certain way. Above all, one must try to understand just where they are, and where the hitch comes. But that may well be beyond us; in its fullest sense it must be. We have to realize, and our one business is to get them to realize, that God Himself is leading them, if only they will not be impatient and too sure that they know everything. Sympathy, willingness to listen, may be the only, and yet all-sufficient, help we can give. Their greatest danger, and it is ours, is that of losing faith in God under an excessive confidence in one's own knowledge and activity. The child of self-confidence is disillusion, but the sister of Faith is Hope.

HERBERT KELLY, S.S.M.

SOME THOUGHTS ON ALLEGORY AND MYTH IN DANTE

I

I AM asking my readers to allow me to lay before them some thoughts which occurred to me after reading the late Professor W. P. Ker's little jewel of an essay on "Allegory and Myth" which he contributed to the Dante Commemoration Volume published in 1921.

W. P. Ker begins his essay by saying that Dante's "account of allegory in the letter to Can Grande leaves out the main thing": it confines itself to the schoolman's use of allegory, and leaves out the poet's use of it. He then goes on at once to state his view of the poet's, as distinguished from the schoolman's, use of Allegory, illustrating his view mainly from two passages of the *Divina Commedia*—in the second canto of the *Purgatorio*, and the seventh of the *Inferno* respectively.

I will not try to paraphrase his statement, but will give it in his own words, in some sentences which I have culled from the whole essay. I think that I am justified in making these sentences stand for the whole essay by the *copiosa rerum densitas*—by the intensive character which distinguishes W. P. Ker's philosophical thought and style, the complete meaning of a whole essay, even of a long one, being always mirrored clearly and distinctly in every part of it—in every sentence of it. We have not to wait for the complete meaning until the essay is ended; the complete meaning is shed upon us throughout, from the very first, reflected, with just some little suggestive individual difference, from every finely-cut phrase or sentence. The intensive character of W. P. Ker's philosophical thought and style is nowhere, I think, in his writings better illustrated than it is in the following sentences which I am extracting from the essay now before us:

"Compare the prose interpretation of the Psalm *In exitu Israel* with the same phrase as it is sung in the celestial ship at the beginning of the *Purgatorio*. The allegory is the same in poetry as in prose; only in the poem the double reference which is part of the nature of allegory is absorbed in the one real meaning. *In exitu Israel de Ægypto* is not a text to be explained tropologically; it is the song of the redeemed, and they are what they sing. Imaginative and poetical allegory is a different thing from the common allegorical interpretation of Scripture; but there are no convenient words to express the differences.

"Poetical allegory has a way of turning into poetical reality; the image into the thing itself."

* * * * *

"Much of the allegory in Dante's poetry is of this sort: reality breaking through and sweeping away the imagery. Dante's vision of eternal life in the *Paradiso* makes use of allegory, like other figures of speech, but the main argument is what he believed without any figure."

* * * * *

"In certain most miraculous works of modern poetry, in Collins's *Ode to Evening*, in Keats's *Autumn*, there is mythological imagination, personifying, and at the same time keeping what may be called the truth of ordinary experience. Wordsworth goes beyond this in his *Ode to Duty*: 'Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong': no figurative imagination, but vision of the law of the world. Dante thinks in the same way of Fortune (*Inf.*, vii.) so intensely that he sees her as a goddess, turning her sphere in like manner as the Intelligences move the spheres of the planets. There is nothing like this anywhere else in his verse or prose; nowhere else does allegory or mythology turn into the revelation of an unknown deity. Nowhere else in Dante is there more clearly the accent of true worship."

These are, indeed, august sentences, and it would be foolish and wrong to try to attach anything of my own to them by way of supplement or correction. I am not going to do that: the sentences shall stand untouched by me with the doctrine of the whole essay—indeed, of all that W. P. Ker has written about Poetry—mirrored in each one of them.

II

I will now ask my readers—at the risk, I fear, of boring them—to go with me along a line of thoughts which occurred to me, or rather, perhaps I should say, a line of mere musings into which I fell, after reading W. P. Ker's Essay on "Allegory and Myth."

The difference between Allegory and Myth is more easily illustrated than defined: *Every Man* is an acted Allegory, the *Antigonê* is an acted Myth. It is, perhaps, only incompletely that one defines the difference between the two dramas when one says that *Every Man* has its other-meaning, its interpretation, its moral, and that the *Antigonê* has no moral. Taking the difference, however, between Allegory and Myth to be, at least, this, one may say that the *Divina Commedia* contains, within its compass, many pieces—mostly short pieces—some of which are allegories and not myths, and others which are myths and not allegories. The description of the Procession in the Earthly Paradise (*Purg.* xxix. ff.) is an allegorical piece; the account of the last voyage of Ulysses (*Inf.* xxvi.) is a myth; and the account of the agony of Ugolino and his sons in the Tower of Famine in Pisa (*Inf.* xxxiii.) is also a Myth, for a Myth need not, any more than an Allegory, be always a fictitious

narrative or account: a narrative or account which is true to fact in history or in natural science is, indeed, always apt to assume the nature of Myth in the mind of the great poet, just as it is apt, equally with a fictitious narrative or account, to assume the nature of Allegory in scholastic hands: Philo's allegorical treatment of the history of his race, and the allegorical treatment of the natural history of animals and gems in *Physiologus*, are allegorical interpretations of matters of fact equally characteristic of scholastic method with the allegorical interpretation of the fictions of Greek mythology which we find in Neoplatonic writers.

May I dwell, for a little while, on the proposition that a narrative or account which is true to fact in history or in natural science is always apt to assume the nature of Myth in the mind of the great poet? Here, it may be thought, is a proposition which is meaningless in the absence of a complete definition of Myth—that is, of Myth at its highest as it issues from the mind of the great poet. To define Myth by its obvious difference from Allegory in having no moral is well enough, perhaps, so far as it goes, but more is required in a complete definition. The difference of Myth from Fiction, as such, must also be included—especially that difference as the great poet enables us to see it; and then, after these differences have been included in the definition, there still remains hidden in the notion of Myth the ground of another difference—the τελευταία διαφορά, the little last difference which makes all the difference between a narrative or account true to fact in history or natural science, and the great poet's transfiguration of that narrative or account. It may well be asked, Can such a complete definition of Myth be found, including its difference from Allegory, from Fiction, and, above all, from true history and science, in the mind of the great poet? And, if such a complete definition cannot be found, is not the proposition "A narrative or account true to fact in history or natural science is always apt to assume the nature of Myth in the mind of the great poet" a meaningless proposition? My answer is—such a complete definition of Myth, indeed, cannot be found; but it does not follow from this that our proposition is meaningless; such a complete definition of Myth cannot be found because, in trying to find it, we should be trying to know, and, as it were, take possession of, the mind of the great poet, forgetting that he "is free, out-topping knowledge": but, although a complete definition of Myth at its highest—equivalent to a complete understanding of the mind of the great poet—is beyond our reach, his utterance of Myth is a miraculous unique thing which we cannot mistake

for anything other, or less, than itself, and so, although we must renounce *definition*, we have what, after all, is far better —quite unmistakable *examples* of Myth at its highest.

Renouncing definition, then, and turning to examples, we have them in the *Divina Commedia*, in short pieces such as the Last Voyage of Ulysses and the Agony of Ugolino and his sons already mentioned; but, after all, the example which teaches us most about the nature of Myth is the *Divina Commedia* itself as one whole. This is the greatest example of Myth in the world, I think, mainly because it is the greatest imaginative transfiguration of fact ever achieved—of actual fact and of what Dante believed to be fact. Look at the extent of the achievement! Personal experience, the most vivid and various, in public and private life; the history and politics of Italy and Europe, of Church and Empire, together with all the metaphysical and moral, and all the natural, science of his age, accepted by him as a true account of facts, on the authority of the Philosopher corroborated by his own observation and study; and, to complete all, a large coherent system of exact theological truth vouched for by the Holy Scriptures and the Church—all this vast material of fact, and of what he believed to be fact, is transfigured into the one Myth which is the *Divina Commedia*.

Others have transfigured parts of the vast material of fact, but only Dante has transfigured the whole. Natural Science has been transfigured into Myth in the *De Rerum Natura*, Theology in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, History in *The Heart of Midlothian*, Personal Experience in *The Prelude*. These are a few examples—the list might be far extended—of the work of poetical imagination in various parts of the field of fact which Dante's imagination holds wholly. I name these four examples, taking leave to add a few sentences, in passing, about one of them only—about the poem of Lucretius, a masterpiece which I have had much in mind throughout these musings. Certain beautiful short passages of lyrical quality, here and there occurring in the *De Rerum Natura*, have too often caused students to regard the long passages of technical exposition which make up the bulk of the poem as "unpoetical" by contrast. This is entirely to misjudge these long passages. They are essentially "poetical"; indeed, it is in virtue of them that the *De Rerum Natura* is a great poem; it is in them that we see poetic imagination at its most miraculous work of secretly transfiguring the exposition of science into Myth—into a history or account, not of the ordinary sort which awakens curiosity and satisfies it by information, but of the extraordinary sort which fills one with the awe and wondering

surmise out of which visions spring. If one reads these long passages of the *De Rerum Natura* aright, a vision symbolic of human life and destiny begins to haunt one like a forgotten dream: then, suddenly, the vision becomes manifest, but only for a moment, called up, perhaps, by the sound of some memorable phrase: then, after a while, it reappears, and shines out clearly, for a longer time, over one of the beautiful lyrical passages perhaps, or, perhaps, elsewhere, over some less ornate passage: then, it fades away, as visions, being visions, fade. I have called it a vision symbolic of human life and destiny, by "symbolic" not meaning "illustrative" or "explanatory," but, rather (to speak with Plato), "reminiscent" of human life and destiny—reminiscent of the "law of the world" long forgotten. This is the vision—doubtless differently figured in different minds, and in the same mind differently figured at different times—which springs out of the *De Rerum Natura* when it is read aright. It is as source of such a vision that the *De Rerum Natura* is a great poem—a great Myth, not a scientific treatise. It is always a sombre vision, but—on this I wish to insist strongly—it is not so sombre as to kill hope; for, although his language is that of a materialistic philosophy in which hedonism is apt soon to wear down into pessimism, the seamy side of the web, Lucretius is, at heart, no Epicurean, but a Roman Stoic, like his great fellow-countryman Leopardi, so falsely called a pessimist.* It would, indeed, be an event of moment in the life of the New Epoch we are now entering if some great poet—another Lucretius—were to arise and teach men to be still of good hope in presence of the new atomism—most of all, perhaps, in presence of its appalling astronomy, so different from Dante's comfortable astronomy with its "Love that moves the Sun and all the Stars."

It is understood, I trust, that I am not trying to find a formal definition of Myth, only pointing to unmistakable examples of the production of this wonder out of material at the disposal of the great poet. Having given examples where the material is fact, I will now give some where it is fiction.

The African beast-story, I suppose, is the plainest instance of fiction that can be taken. This, we know, is sometimes traditional, sometimes impromptu, most often both. It has no moral, until some Æsop adds one. Then, in course of time, other Æsops more and more sophisticated arise who start with morals and invent fictitious stories to bear them. Mean-

* The charge of "pessimism" brought against Leopardi is discussed and refuted by G. L. Bickersteth in the illuminating Introduction prefixed to his admirable edition of the *Poems of Leopardi* (Cambridge, at the University Press. 1923).

while the making of fictitious stories which have no morals has been going evenly on, producing stories ever more and more beautiful, and, at last, the miraculous sort out of which visions symbolic of human life and destiny are apt to appear and visit the individual mind of some inspired maker, and the collective mind of his audience—a little clan. So the way is prepared—by the Æsops, I think, as well as by the inspired makers—for such inspired makers and users of fiction as were Plato and Dante, and, with obvious differences, Bunyan, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats. I am not including Spenser's great poem in my list of English examples of fiction transfigured into Myth. *The Faerie Queene* is, throughout, a movement of beautiful pictures put on the stage with perfect art; but no vision symbolic of human life and destiny flashes into our eyes here, on a sudden, and then fades away, as is our experience when we go through the equally "fictitious" relation of Dante's ascension, with Beatrice, through the heavenly spheres. Spenser is the obverse, if I may so speak, of Dante. Allegorical meaning comes first in Spenser's mind, and suggests pictures to his fancy, and that is all: no vision shaped by imagination flashes out. In the *Divina Commedia* precise allegorical meaning, as Spenser is concerned with it, counts for very little that really matters. Of course Dante, following the fashion of his time, uses Allegory freely as a literary trope; but it is always, even where this trope is in evidence, the narrative, whether true or fictitious, with its persons and places, that is his first concern. To take a typical instance of this: allegorical meaning has been suspected, or detected, in the story of the monsters, in the dark wood, at the entrance of Hell (*Inf.*, i.); but if Dante is thinking here of allegorical meaning at all, it is only as an afterthought; the monsters are there independently of their allegorical meaning; the poet's first and, I believe, sole concern is to express the horror of the darkness and danger through which he is entering upon his great adventure.

To return now to the four English names I have mentioned —Bunyan, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats—*The Ancient Mariner*, *Adonais*, *Hyperion* are plain examples of Myth produced out of material which is fiction, traditional, or invented by the poets themselves: and they are examples of what I have called Myth at its highest—a history, set forth by the great poet, in which vision symbolic of human life and destiny is implicit. *The Pilgrim's Progress*, too, is an example of this, but it stands nearer to the *Divina Commedia* than the three others stand because, like the *Divina Commedia*, it stands on a foundation in which theological doctrine, accepted as expressing exact truth, is, as it were, the skeleton of the story.

But how soon the skeleton is covered out of sight by the raiment of flesh and blood it puts on! How soon do we become aware, as we read *The Pilgrim's Progress*, that the theological Allegory is a religious Allegory, and, then, that it is not an Allegory at all, but a Myth—an intense tale about persons and places, out of which visions symbolic of human life and destiny are apt suddenly to arise—differently figured visions in different minds, and, perhaps, in the same mind differently figured at different times, but all of them akin to the sight which Christian has of the Gate of the Holy City seen dimly, through a glass, from the Delectable Mountains, or clearly from the River-side—even as Dante, having ascended to the Tenth Heaven, has sight of the Celestial Rose!

If the *Divina Commedia* and *The Pilgrim's Progress* stand so near to each other as my musings have brought me to think that they stand, some light seems to be thrown by this on the question, What, after all, is the position of Allegory in the *Divina Commedia?* Is that position so dominant that the *Divina Commedia*, as a whole, must be regarded as "one great allegory"? If so, then *The Pilgrim's Progress*, too, in which the position of Allegory, is, at least, equally dominant, must be regarded as "one great allegory." Well, let that conclusion be provisionally granted: but it does not touch the main thing, that one does not begin to read *The Pilgrim's Progress* aright until one has forgotten that it is an allegory. The same, I submit, may be said about the *Divina Commedia*.

Dr. W. W. Jackson has shown, in the illuminating Introductory Essay prefixed to his translation of the *Convivio*, that "Beatrice becomes an allegorical personage, properly so-called, for the first time in the *Commedia*." Allegorically interpreted she is the Queen of the Sciences, Theology, the allegorical interpretation, as I think Dr. Jackson wishes us to understand, being of the "anagogic" kind. I wonder if I may venture to claim Dr. Jackson's authority here in support of the view to which my musings have brought me, that the *Divina Commedia*, like *The Pilgrim's Progress*, is read aright only if one forgets that it is an Allegory. My own experience is that it is easier to forget that the *Divina Commedia* is an Allegory than to forget that *The Pilgrim's Progress* is an Allegory; and when I try to account for this difference, the reason which enables me to do so seems to me, at once, to carry me much further—seems to give me good ground for thinking that the *Divina Commedia* as one whole (whatever may be thought about *The Pilgrim's Progress* as one whole) is essentially not an Allegory. The reason which carries me so far is that the *Divina Commedia* is a unique work—a "human document"—inasmuch as, for

its author, the meaning of the poem as one whole is present intensively in that part of it which is Beatrice, a real person—far too real to be ever seriously regarded by her lover as a type of something else. It is always Beatrice, remembered as he saw her on earth, who quickens Dante's imagination and faith throughout the whole course of the spiritual experience recorded in the *Divina Commedia*—who gives him Virgil to lead him through Hell and up the Mount of Purgatory, who receives him in the Earthly Paradise, who guides him through the spheres of the Heavenly Paradise, and, at last, smiles her farewell to him from her seat in the Congregation of the Celestial Rose. From beginning to end, throughout the whole *Divina Commedia*, she is a real person for Dante—more real, I think, there than when he saw her on earth—real with that reality which platonizing schoolmen attributed to the Angels—the reality of having, each one of them, his own separate Eternal Idea present in him—an individual, not a specific, Idea. The allegorical interpretation of such a real Beatrice—if we must still speak of allegorical interpretation—can only be "anagogic"—a spiritual interpretation: the Theology she stands for is not the Theology of the Doctors which is an exact science; it is, rather, Religion which is a Life—Dante's own personal religion with its ideal of the Communion of the Saints pictured in his last vision of her seated in the Congregation of the Redeemed.

I have tried to explain what I take to be the anagogic interpretation of Beatrice regarded as an allegorical personage in the *Divina Commedia*, and what I consequently take to be the anagogic interpretation of the whole poem regarded as one great Allegory. I like "one great Myth" better than "one great Allegory" here; but, after all, the *Divina Commedia*, as an Allegory to be anagogically interpreted, differs in nothing that matters from a Myth to be devoutly received without interpretation. So I leave it at that.

J. A. Stewart.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Professor J. A. Stewart, who contributes a striking article on Dante to the current number, is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, and well known for his classical work on *The Myths of Plato.*

We owe an apology to the Rev. A. E. Baker for delay in publishing the second portion of his essay on "The Christian Mystery." We gather that the first portion of it, which appeared in May, gave some the impression that its author was a "Modernist"; but we do not think that the second will bear that out.

A correspondent writes:

"I was recently abroad, and there met a Benedictine Monk, who assured me that the present policy of Rome is dead against the subdivision of dioceses.

"They like to keep their dioceses as large as possible, and to this end make full use of coadjutor bishops, conferring on them very real powers and jurisdiction—and often the right of succession. Even in the important Archdiocese of Paris (so I understood my informant to say), this right of succession is given. Rome, he added, regards the large number of small dioceses which she has inherited from past ages as a positive hindrance to her work."

The Editor begs to acknowledge the following (March to September):

Half-Yearly: Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.

Quarterly: Journal of Theological Studies; Anglican Theological Review (U.S.A.); Hibbert Journal; Biblica (Rome); Gregorianum (Rome); Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses (Louvain); Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society; Interpreter; Journal of Religion (Chicago); Pilgrim; International Review of Missions.

Monthly: Expositor; Blackfriars; American Church Monthly; Churchman; Expository Times; Bilychnis (Italy); Nouvelle Revue Théologique (Louvain); La Vie et les Arts liturgiques (Paris); Modern Churchman.

We have received a copy of a beautiful tribute paid by Bishop Brent to the memory of Robert Hallowell Gardiner, who died on June 15 last. As the Bishop says, "Had it not been for him practical steps to make a World Conference on Faith and Order an enterprise would have been wanting." He was indeed its life and soul, and we trust that its future work will answer to the high hopes and splendid vision of its first Secretary. R.I.P.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

GAL. iii. 20 *ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν* (*Now a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one*).

This sentence occurs in one of St. Paul's characteristic arguments, which defy the translator. Dictated for an emergency, vibrant with emotion, depending for its interpretation on many conversations never recorded which the writer had had with the recipients of the letter—the passage is almost meaningless unless the commentator paraphrases it and, by an inevitably subjective process, fills in the gaps and amplifies the allusions.

In the background are the Judaisers. Recent criticism has done justice to these men, who indeed, though the future was not to be theirs, had a strong case. They visualised the Gentile mission just as every Jewish Christian must have done at first. As the Jews welcomed Gentiles as "God-fearers," an outer ring of adherents who kept the moral law and in various ways respected the prejudices of the Jews proper, so these Christians raised no objection to the baptism of Gentiles, but held that circumcision was the entrance to a higher stage. St. Paul saw that the issue was vital. Not thus could the Gospel become a world-religion. We owe him the greatest possible gratitude for his insight and firmness, but need not accept his view of the Judaisers.

To understand verse 20 we must begin as far back as verse 15, paraphrasing freely.

Brethren, let me give you an illustration from common life.* When a man's covenant or will† has once been validated (by the observance of all legal forms or by his death), no one can make it invalid or execute a second document affecting its contents. Now the promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. Note that the Scripture uses the singular. According to the accepted canons of exegesis we are justified in seeing a significance in this. The plural "seeds" would have implied a plurality, the singular points unmistakably to a single person, namely Christ. (You remember what the promise was in Gen. xxii. 18. "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth—*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* LXX.—be blessed." The promise has been fulfilled in our experience. You Gentiles have entered the Church and are already *in Christ*. That means Christ, the seed foretold, is entering upon His inheritance as the Gentile mission progresses, and you in Him are fellow-heirs.)‡ I mean this. A covenant already ratified by God the law which came 430 years later cannot invalidate, to make the promise void. The inheritance of which God told Abraham (that inheritance into which you *in Christ* are now

* "Brethren, I speak after the manner of men: Though it be but a man's covenant, yet . . ." (R.V.) cannot pass. *ὅμως* "nevertheless" must connect this sentence with the preceding. The sense is not that required. Probably it should be accentuated *ὁμῶς* (as in 1 Cor. xiv. 7) with Blass. The meaning is "in the same way"; it introduces the illustration, but can be omitted in English where juxtaposition of the clauses is sufficient.

† *διαθήκη* in the papyri = "will." There is no need to tie down the meaning here to one or the other. The will is the outstanding example of a covenant.

‡ This passage in brackets seems to me an essential part of the argument. St. Paul will have preached along these lines and the reference to Gen. xxii. 18 was sufficient to recall his teaching.

entering) must be either conditioned by obedience to the Law, or else a fulfilment of God's promise. It cannot be both. (If, as the Judaisers assert, keeping the law is necessary, then God's promise is valueless.) But God's gift to Abraham (and by implication to his seed) *was* by promise, nothing was said about keeping the Law. What *is* this Law? It was a subsequent addition in the divine economy, added to produce sins* (to increase the number of sins which a good man has to guard against and prove the hopelessness of getting salvation by the Pharisaic Halachah, or way of legality). It was a temporary provision intended to last until Christ came, the seed in whom the promise should come true. And whereas the promise was given directly by God, the law came through angels, through their representative Moses. God is one and needs no representative, but a crowd of angels had to choose some one as their spokesman. In thus pointing out the secondary position of the Law, we do not of course imply that it was in any way contrary to the promise.

If the above interpretation is correct, there is no contrast between a human and a divine covenant, as R.V. implies. Two covenants are contrasted in iv. 24, but they need not be imported into the present passage. The contrast is only between promise and Law. The promise is permanent, for it is fulfilled in the Gospel; the Law is transitory. The promise was given by God: the Law by angels. The promise was given directly: the Law by a mediator. Dr Peake inclines to this interpretation, though he says the passage is exceedingly difficult and verse 20 may be a gloss. "No confidence can be felt in any interpretation."

What part were the angels thought to have played on Sinai? Except for one passage in Josephus there is no first century evidence outside the New Testament for their supposed giving of the Law. I suggest that Heb. ii. 2 "the word spoken through angels" is derived from Gal. iii. 19, and that St. Paul's expression is derived from Stephen's speech in Acts vii. If St. Luke sometimes gives us speeches composed in the Thucydidean manner, it is agreed on all sides that Stephen's speech contains very primitive elements.† St. Paul heard it at a crisis in his life shortly before his conversion. The concluding words "by the ordinances of angels"‡ may well have lodged in his mind and borne fruit in later years. We may imagine him during the years when he was thinking out his gospel brooding over the mystery of the law, good and holy and yet such an obstacle in the way of the acceptance of the gospel by the Gentiles. At last he gets a clue. The Law is secondary. Spirits interested in human affairs have intervened and dictated all these ordinances—touch not, taste not, handle not. God has *allowed* their intervention only. But these angels, so he teaches in Colossians, are themselves the objects of Christ's reconciling work (i. 20); the divine pleroma dwells in them (ii. 9) and is not, as Philo taught, divided among

* *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν.* Cf. Rom. v. 20 "the Law came in beside, that the trespass might abound." R.V. "because of transgressions" suggests that the Law was a remedy for sin, an impossible idea in the light of Romans.

† Dr. Abrahams in his second series of *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospel* (1924) is the latest witness to this view. Except for the conclusion, the speech he says is thoroughly Hebraic.

‡ *εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων = ἐν διαταγαῖς ἀγγέλων.*

the angelic powers; the worshipping of angels (ii. 18) is a kind of Judaising connected with the legalism mentioned in ii. 16, 17.

Philo's doctrine of the angels aptly illustrates what we have said I quote from Dr. Drummond (*Philo*, II. 144 b). "Those whom other philosophers called demons, Moses was accustomed to call angels. Now, they are souls flying in the air, some of whom descend into bodies; 'but others did not think fit ever to be united with any of the parts of the earth, whom, being consecrated and taking charge of the service of the Father, the Fabricator is accustomed to use as assistants and ministers for the care of mortals.' Souls and demons and angels are then different names for one and the same subject." "The sun, moon and stars form an ethereal host more remote from man, while the angels are an aerial army, nearer to the earth and more interested in human affairs."

I see one objection to the view here upheld. In what sense was Moses a mediator when he received the law and Abraham not one when he received the promise? Moses, I would answer, was a mediator between a host of angels on the one side and the nation of Israel on the other. God spoke to Abraham directly, and the patriarch was at that time the entire nation (cf. Heb. vii. 10).

I think "mediator" must refer to Moses in the light of *The Assumption of Moses* i. 14. "And so He planned and ordained me, who before of old was prepared to be the mediator of His covenant." Otherwise I should propose to base the Galatians passage to a still further extent on Stephen's speech. In Acts vii. 38 Stephen speaks of the angel which spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, in vii. 53 of the angels who ordained the law. May not the angels of Gal. iii. 19 be the angels of Acts vii. 53 and the mediator the single angel of Acts vii. 38?

W. K. L. C.

LITURGICA

The six numbers of *La Vie et les Arts liturgiques* which have been issued since our last summary (March, 1924) have shown no signs of abating power to arouse the studious and the devout reader's interest, except that perhaps a smaller proportion than usual of the subjects dealt with will appeal to those outside the Roman Communion. Foremost, however, amongst the articles which have thus appealed one would put Dom D. Buenner's (in January, 1924) on *la Fête ancienne de la Circoncision*, in which he seeks by adducing a number of interesting facts or suggestions to connect the origin of the Feast with the Church of *S. Maria antiqua* in the Forum at Rome. There have also been three further *chroniques* by L. Gt. on *la Liturgie à l'Étranger*, which give much useful and enlightening information: *e.g.* (on p. 137 *f.*), on the reaction from *la regrettable tactique de "latinisation" de l'Orient* (for which see also *les rites orientaux à Paris*, by A. C. in June); (pp. 231 *ff.*) on the question of *honoraires des Messes*; (pp. 325 *ff.*) on the recent revival of classical (especially of patristic) studies in France; (pp. 327 *ff.*) on the sixth centenary of the canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas. Those who are concerned with the difficult question of children's presence for worship at Holy Communion may find some help in M. Gaucheron's two articles on the subject

(September, 1923, and March, 1924). Among articles of a kind less directly suggestive to non-Roman readers, though carefully prepared and well considered in themselves, should be mentioned three by Dom P. de Puniet on Baptism and Confirmation, two by F. Gellé on Frequent Communions, and one by Dom L. Beauduin on the Easter Mystery yearly, weekly, and daily realized *dans la vie liturgique*. Only one English book recently published of any importance receives notice—viz., Walpole's *Early Latin Hymns;* but many will turn with the liveliest interest to L. Gt.'s short notice (in February) of the monograph in 2 vols. (Paris and New York), by Dr. Eisen, on the very early Christian chalice discovered at Antioch in 1910. Professor A. B. Cook published an article on the chalice in the *Cambridge Review* for February 15 last, in which he pronounced it "certainly genuine and unique."

C. L. Feltoe.

ANIMA CHRISTI

In the February number (1923) of *La Vie and les Arts liturgiques* Dom L. Gougaud, O.S.B., has published and briefly commented on the following ancient French text of this devotion:

Ame de ihesu crist sauue moy.
Corps de ihesu crist sanctifie moy.
Sang de ihesu crist enyure moy.
Yaue qui issi du coste dieu loue moy.
Passion de ihesu crist conforte moy.
Et bon ihesu essance moy.
Et ne me souffre pas estir sepaire foy.
Du malin esprit deffent moy.
A leure de la mort appelle moy
Et me mest de coste foy.
Si que auec les anges ie te loe
En siècle des siècles. Amen.

It is contained in a Book of Hours now in the (R.C.) episcopal library at Southwark, which the Librarian (Rev. J. R. Fletcher) considers to have been compiled in the South of France (probably at Avignon) somewhere about the latter half of the fourteenth century. Thus a fresh blow is given to the theories that St. Ignatius Loyola († 1556) or Bishop Bernadin de Feltre composed it, and it goes some way to confirm a more recent suggestion that Pope John XXII., who reigned at Avignon, 1316–1334, was the author. The considerations Dom. Gougaud puts forward are far from being fanciful and baseless; indeed, they have been already anticipated to some extent by (among others) Canon Brightman in his note on the devotion as given by Bishop Andrewes in his *Preces Privatæ* (see his English Translation, pp. 93 and 331: Methuen, 1903). He ends, however, with a suggestion which is sufficiently startling, though he does not discuss it—viz., that as there is now (*a*) a German, (*b*) a French text of it of the fourteenth century, and (*c*) an Italian form of the fifteenth century, it is not impossible that the Latin text with which we are familiar (with variations) is not the original after all. But, if so, in which language was it given to the Church?

C. L. Feltoe.

THE ODES OF SOLOMON

A SELECTION RENDERED INTO ENGLISH VERSE, WITH SUGGESTED TUNES, BY S. P. T. PRIDEAUX, D.D.

I.

The Crown

A crown! a crown is on my head,
Of vigorous root and blossoms free,
A crown of truth that withers not,
For 'tis Thyself who crownest me.

And Thou, O Lord, Thyself art Crown,
Thy full perfection here I see,
Salvation, Life, and Fruitfulness,
My Crown and Joy eternally.

Tune, E.H., 14: "Puer nobis nascitur."

III.

The Coming of Love

Love who can know except Love come to him?
Except he be beloved, who Love descry?
Me the Lord loved and now I love the Lord,
And where His rest is there also am I.

No strangers we—His is no grudging heart,
The Lord Most High is merciful and free;
Now we are one, the Lover and the loved,
As He the Son is, I a son shall be.
(*or*) The Eternal Son His Sonship shares with me.

In Him is life for those who life desire;
So saith the Spirit, and He doth not lie;
Wherefore sing praise to God, ye sons of men,
And serve with wise and ever watchful eye.

Tune, Hymns of the Kingdom, 92: Woodlands. Or E.H., 429: All Souls.

V.

Salvation

I love Thee, Lord; I praise Thee, Lord;
Forsake me not, Most High.
Thou art my hope; Thy grace is free,
And I shall live thereby.

Let my foes come and find me not,
And have no light to see;
In cloudy darkness let them grope
And not take hold of me.

Their counsel do Thou turn to naught,
On their head let it fall;
Their evil hopes do Thou make void,
Their mighty power enthral.

In God's my hope, I will not fear,
He my salvation is;
I will not fear, He is my Crown
Against my enemies.

Tho' all things shake my feet stand firm,
I live tho' all things die;
For He's with me and I with Him
To all eternity.

Tune, E.H., 186: Rodwell.

XIV.

The Heavenly Father

To Thee, O Lord, my eyes I turn,
For Thou my Father art;
My Mother, too—Thou feedest me
And joy dost aye impart.

Turn not Thy mercies then from me,
Thy kindness still extend;
Stretch out at all times Thy right hand
And guide me to the end.

Thee would I please, and meekly bow
And own Thy glorious name;
Confirm in me Thy love's fair fruit
And keep me from all shame.

Teach me Thy truth. Open to me
Thy Holy Spirit's lyre;
With fullest chord I'll sing Thy praise
And join the heavenly choir.

Thy tender mercies numberless
So shalt Thou pour on me;
Thou canst supply our every need—
Then hear us speedily.

Tune, A. and M., Second Supplement, 267: Westminster New.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (I.-II. Timothy and Titus). By Walter Lock, D.D. (T. and T. Clark.)

It would be hard to find a person better qualified than Dr. Lock to write a Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, or, indeed, upon any part of St. Paul's writings. His lectures on St. Paul's Epistles for the Honour School of Theology were among the most successful and attractive courses in Oxford forty years ago. Starting with first-rate Classical Scholarship, Dr. Lock has concentrated years of study on St. Paul. He has kept his eyes open for any new light from any source: in later years he has added the interest and stimulus of a seminar to his own private studies, and all along his work as a Christian minister has maintained in him a spirit of sympathetic understanding of St. Paul's purpose, without which the best scholarship may easily prove sterile and unintelligent. The present work shows plentiful signs of this long and varied experience of Pauline study.

The book follows the usual lines. There is an Introduction containing a careful and minute analysis of the contents of the Epistles. The Commentary then follows, with a separate analysis of each Epistle prefixed. The general analysis is exceptionally full and detailed, and the references for the various statements are exhaustively given. Some of the difficult questions raised by the Epistles are considered in this section, but, as is natural, discussion of particular passages is to be found in the Commentary. The notes are unusually interesting, often by the train of thought they arouse or imply, quite as much as by what they actually say. For instance, in the passage dealing with asceticism and the principle of receiving the gift of God (1 Tim. iv. 4), Dr. Lock remarks: "λαμβανόμενον If taken as a gift—not treated as a right—and with gratitude. The divine word is constantly λάβετε, φάγετε (Matt. xxvi. 26)." There is here a whole philosophy of the Eucharist and its relation to human life. It is matter for congratulation, that Dr. Lock takes σωματικὴ γυμνασία (1 Tim. iv. 8) of athletic and not ascetic discipline. The doctrine that bodily exercise profiteth little is a godly and comfortable doctrine, and profitable for these times. In some cases Dr. Lock supports the Authorized Version as against the R.V. For instance, in 1 Tim. vi. 10, he says: "ῥίζα, not 'a root' [of all evil], which would suggest that the writer was thinking of

other possible roots, but 'the root.'" And again, in a passage that has been much discussed (2 Tim. iii. 16), bearing on the inspiration of the Holy Scripture, Dr. Lock prefers to take θεόπνευστος as a predicate. "All Scripture is inspired by God, and therefore useful." In all such cases the arguments are clearly and very briefly set out, and the conclusion preferred is simply stated: there are few very long notes. In this respect the book will probably be useful to persons already acquainted with some of the literature connected with the Epistle, rather than to beginners.

There are many passages to which it is tempting to refer, but it is not so much the particular texts which are of primary interest in these Epistles: the real problem about them is their authorship and history. Dr. Lock, while he recognizes the strength of the arguments against their authenticity, and gives full references to books in which the question is discussed at greater length, is on the whole inclined to regard them as genuine. He points out that the "evidence of Church writers is the same as for the other letters of St. Paul" (p. xxv). He affirms, quite rightly as we think, that "doctrinal background is essentially Pauline" (p. xxvi), and that "equally Pauline is the stress upon organization and discipline" (p. xxvii). He feels the difficulty of the style and vocabulary, though he concludes that "the argument from style is in favour of the Pauline authorship, that from vocabulary strongly, but not conclusively against it" (p. xxix). In this connection he observes, with wisdom: "I doubt whether St. Paul would have allowed much freedom to an amanuensis" (p. xxix). Surely he is right here: unless St. Paul had changed a good deal in his old age, it is highly improbable that he would have left his actual words unsettled. Yet the conclusion is, as Dr. Lock says, difficult, though it is true that "there is no word impossible to St. Paul, no word not natural to him" (*ibid.*). All the points here mentioned are, and will be, disputed; we think, however, that Dr. Lock's conclusion is right. There are, however, one or two points which it may be worth while to consider shortly in regard to the whole method of dealing with these questions.

It would appear that Dr. Lock is somewhat pessimistic as to the possibility of any conclusion being reached in such matters. He says in his Preface (p. iv): "I cannot but think that by this time in the history of Christianity the question of authorship of almost any book of the Bible has become of secondary importance." Surely this is a great exaggeration, and implies a profound change in the basis of the Christian Faith. Christianity is not a system of speculation nor a code of morals, which might stand upon its argumentative or

pragmatist value: it runs back upon a manifestation in time of the Son of God, which occurred or did not occur, and for the knowledge of which we depend upon the witness of those who said and heard. If we have no historical contact with the first days, and the earliest believers, what are we to make of St. Paul's conviction that God sent His Son at the fulness of the times ? (*cf.* Tit. i. 3). In the early days there is no thought more fundamental than that of qualified witness, and this is hardly compatible with the notion of nameless writings by persons of whom nothing is known. Dr. Lock has mentioned the fact that the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles was disputed by heretics (p. xxvi)—that is, by persons whose conception of Christianity was rejected by the Church of their day: but he also points out that the existence of these Epistles " is probably carried back to a first-century date when a mistake about their authorship is unlikely. No other author's name has ever been suggested " (p. xxvi).

This last appears to us to be a point of very great importance which is very frequently overlooked. We have lost a great deal of the literature of the earliest days, and we know hardly anything of the persons who formed the Church in those days. We are prone, therefore, to transfer to those days our barren conception of what they were like, and to forget that there were in existence many persons to the end of the first century—at any rate, who must have seen and known apostles and their immediate entourage. It is, as Dr. Lock says, unlikely that a mistake about the authorship of the received books should have been made. The Apocryphal New Testament, recently published in a translation by the Provost of Eton, shows that there were plenty of books going back a long way in the history of the Church and claiming great names unsuccessfully, and it shows the spirit and capacity which went to the construction of these documents. No doubt the existence of persons likely to know about the origin of documents such as the Pastoral Epistles is to some extent conjectural, but they are *veræ causæ :* there must have been some people in existence who kept the Church in the lines which ultimately determined the character of its message. It may be questioned whether the odd person, for instance, who preserved the first two verses of the Epistle to Titus and two verses from chapter iii., and then wrote the rest of the Epistle has equal claims to the title of *vera causa.*

There are, of course, as Dr. Lock points out, stylistic difficulties in the traditional view of these Epistles. But are we sure enough of the way in which St. Paul thought and wrote to put implicit trust in Mr. Harrison's diagrams of the usage

of words, and Mr. Rose's account of St. Paul's *clausulæ?* Dr. Lock does not appear to be wholly persuaded by these arguments. May it not be that some of these lines of criticism produce a fictitious air of uncertainty over a question of authorship that may really be rather simple?

T. B. Ripon.

SAINT JOAN

Saint Joan: A Chornicle Play, in Six Scenes and an Epilogue. By Bernard Shaw. Constable, 1924.

The Life of Joan of Arc. By Anatole France, translated by Winifred Stephens. John Lane, 1909.

The Maid of France. By Andrew Lang. Longmans, 1908.

Jeanne d'Arc. By Mrs. Oliphant. Putnams, 1896.

Jeanne d'Arc. By T. Douglas Murray. Heinemann, 1902.

Procès de Condamnation, etc. By Ch. de Beaurepaire Cagniard, Rouen, 1890.

In 1431 Jeanne d'Arc was judicially murdered. In 1455 the trial was reconsidered and the condemnation annulled as wicked and unjust. In the twentieth century the "rehabilitation" has gone much further. Jeanne d'Arc has been formally canonized, and popularly she has become the national saint of France. England, which had no small share in her condemnation, has now almost as great a share in her admission to glory and honour. English writers have been among the first to sound her praises. An English cathedral church has accepted a statue of her, presented by English and Americans. And the greatest dramatic success of the last year has been a play written by our greatest dramatist upon her story. The character of the Maid has been played with tense enthusiasm and sympathy by an actress of genius. The play has been read to delighted audiences in Swiss hotels by Sir Oliver Lodge. It has been the subject of innumerable newspaper articles. County newspapers have given descriptions even of the place where it was written. Jeanne d'Arc has "come into her own." Now, the claim of Jeanne d'Arc to the admiration of the world lies indubitably in the fact that she was a religious heroine. There have been disputes about her military capacity: it has even been said that it was not through her that France was reconquered. But about her saintship there is no doubt. It is the Church which has given her her place among the great names in the history of the world.

While the wave of enthusiasm with which Mr. Bernard

Shaw's play has been received is still at the full it may be worth while for students of religion to enquire what is its momentum. What is the figure of Joan which the impressive play presents before us?

There can be no doubt at all that Mr. Bernard Shaw has studied the subject very closely. In his preface (which many may consider much more interesting than most of his prefaces and almost as wrongheaded), he may seem to concentrate his attention too much upon Anatole France and Andrew Lang and Mark Twain. It may seem to those who know her book that he has found himself continually in agreement with Mrs. Oliphant. But where critics have felt disposed to dispute his statements, he will be found again and again to be in the right. He has seized upon vivid details in the books of old and made them live again to-day. But is the Joan he shows the Joan of history? He is very anxious to explain her in terms of the twentieth century. Is it really possible to explain any mediæval saint in terms of the twentieth century? Perhaps not; and that, perhaps, is why he brushes aside the enormous mass of strange mediæval beliefs and finds Joan "the queerest fish among the eccentric worthies of the Middle Ages." He finds her astonishingly abnormal and then tries to make her fit into a twentieth-century explanation. He thinks she had "terrifying ability," and that she knew it and knew other people to be fools, but did not know when she inspired extreme fear and inextinguishable jealousy. He thinks she got a fairer trial than she would get to-day. The explanation he gives of her voices is that "her dramatic imagination played tricks with her senses." The "voices and visions were illusory, and their wisdom all Joan's own." She was, to sum up, "a sane and shrewd country girl of extraordinary strength of mind and hardihood of body;" but she failed from "inept youth and academic ignorance."

The more we look at Joan from this point of view the more difficult we find it to understand her. But it is more difficult still when we are told that she was quite prepared herself to supersede St. Peter and like Muhammad to settle everything by a private and personal revelation from God. She was, in fact, Mr. Shaw thinks, in modern terms, a Protestant. But that is not all. Though he has brought her so near to our own time, Mr. Shaw is confident that we do not understand her. She is not too marvellous for our belief, she is not marvellous enough: to believe in electrons (whatever they may be) is a reception of the marvellous, more extreme than a belief in angels. Well then, the Middle Ages were quite right to believe in angels and voices and visions and heresy and the Inquisition: quite

honest too. But yet they were quite wrong, and not really honest: they had the lie in the soul; and the twentieth century, or at least its great dramatist, is wise enough to know it.

It is difficult not to feel, in spite of fullest admiration for Mr. Shaw's genius and delight in his ingenuity and admiration for his recognition of real goodness and real heroism, that this is an explanation which leaves us still in the dark. It distorts the story rather than elucidates it. Facts have to be strained to make a brilliant play—and a most brilliant play it is—and strained still more to make a convincing preface. To begin with, the Joan so magnificently played by Miss Sybil Thorndike is not the real Joan: she is only superficially real. The mediæval Joan, if we can trust (as indeed we must) her recorded and legally certified sayings, did not speak or think like a farm lass. She would not call Robert de Baudricourt "squire," in the sense in which a nineteenth-century farm lass might address her landlord. She would not call Charles VII. "Charlie": she always spoke of him as "the most noble dauphin"; or Bertrand de Poulengey "Polly," or Johan de Metz "Jack," whether in ignorance or in impudence. Nor did she call the English "goddams" (which Mr. Shaw makes very funny), but "god-dens," a very different thing. Nor would the clergy and nobles treat their King as if he were a buffoon or a baby, or the Inquisitor condemn a prisoner whom he declared to be entirely innocent. The atmosphere of the play throughout is that of the twentieth, not the fifteenth century. That, of course, makes it the first-rate acting play it is. And the real Joan, who peeps out again and again through its modernisms, inspires Miss Thorndike to present the heroic and saintly figure that she was, in spite of the modernisms and vulgarity of the trappings that have been made to bedeck her.

Was Jeanne condemned after a perfectly fair trial by men who were not consciously wicked? If we take this view we must regard the rehabilitation of 1455 as an imposture: and that seems to be the meaning of Mr. Shaw's epilogue, which most spectators, and quite possibly the leading actress, regard as a tedious anticlimax, and Mr. Shaw believes to be quite essential to the meaning of his play. But is not this a strange, and quite unnecessary, perversion of the truth? The original trial was a long one, and it is impossible, of course, to reproduce it on the stage. But if it is to be understood, it is important to remember that she was not tried by the Inquisition, nor (as would have happened in England) by a statutable court. The Bishop of Beauvais claimed jurisdiction in a charge of heresy as Ordinary. This he exercised. And beside him sat, in a different capacity, the Deputy Inquisitor. The body which judged was an

amalgamation, for which no legal justification can be found, of two jurisdictions. Thus the responsible persons were Pierre Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais, Jean de Maistre, Deputy of the Inquisitor, and the *promoteur* (or prosecutor) Jean d'Estivet. Behind them was the assent, for what it was worth, of the Chapter of Rouen, and (most impressive and potent, though in reality desperately partisan) the authority of the University of Paris, which declared her saints to be demons, her warfare to be treacherous and murderous, and her opinions to be schismatic and heretical. The history of the three chief agents of Joan's murder has been traced by M. Charles de Beaurepaire. Cauchon rose in the world, was the representative of Henry VI. at the Council of Basle, became Bishop of Lisieux (where his tomb is to be seen), and died suddenly at Rouen in 1442 while he was being shaved. Jean de Maistre continued at Rouen as prior of the Jacobins and Vice-Inquisitor. He lived at least till the process of rehabilitation had been begun; the date of his death is not known, but it may have been before the sentence of 1455 was pronounced. As for Jean d'Estivet, the friend of Cauchon, the bitterest foe of the saint, "Il est noyé dans un bourbier peu de temps après le supplice de sa victime." The career of each representative of the University has been traced, and also that of the twelve advocates who were present. The accused had no counsel, and no defender. Is not this sufficient to show that the trial from the first was fundamentally unjust? And it was for this injustice that the trial of 1455 utterly quashed its decision. Nor may it be forgotten that the case and the claims of Jeanne had been investigated at Poitiers by a court presided over by the Archbishop of Rheims; practically she had already been tried and acquitted.

She was condemned in 1431 for her "obstinate temerity" and "unheard-of crimes," for deceitful semblance of contrition, as "obstinate, incorrigible, heretic relapsed into heresy"; and, as was sworn at the later trial, Cauchon said to the English who were waiting outside: "Farewell, be of good cheer: it is done," speaking English: and there was said to the executioner, "simply and without other sentence: Do thy duty."* So "without final sentence or definite judgment she was burnt in the fire." The conflict between Mr. Shaw and the historic facts lies in this: that he considers that Joan was "burnt by normally innocent people in the energy of their righteousness," and that there was not in Cauchon "as much anti-prisoner, pro-police, class and sectarian bias as we can take for granted in our own courts." This is not what the trial shows, or the re-trial decided: so, as Mr. Shaw admits, he must represent

* Murray, p. 163.

Cauchon, Le Maistre, and Warwick "as saying the things they actually would have said if they had known what they were really doing." This makes a very good play; but it is not history.

If Jeanne did not deserve condemnation, and that everyone now admits, then the conclusion of the judges of 1455 may well be preferred to that of any explanation of a later date. Jeanne's truthfulness, it said, had often been passed over, and her statements falsely translated, evil had been attributed to her without evidence, and the articles against her "falsely, calumniously, and deceitfully extracted and contrary even to the confessions of the accused." So the processes and sentences were found "full of cozenage, iniquity, inconsequences, and manifest errors in fact as well as in law," and thus they were declared, with her abjuration, and all that followed, "null, non-existent, without value and effect." Thus the trial was declared illegal and the judges were declared unjust. Indeed, the investigation of the first trial shows no "energy of righteousness" in the original judges. He that doeth righteousness is righteous: he that doeth sin is of the devil.

Two questions are asked. Was Jeanne heretical, refusing to accept the judgment of the Church? Was her belief in the voices founded on a mere delusion?

Jean Massieu, a curé, Dean of the Christianity (*i.e.*, rural dean) of Rouen, who was present at the first trial as assistant to the prosecutor, swore in 1452 that he heard Jeanne tell the judges that "if she had ever said or done anything ill, she was willing to correct and amend according to their decision"; and "you ask me of the Church militant and triumphant. I do not understand these terms: but I am willing to submit to the Church as a good Christian should." The record of evidence at her trial gives her as saying: "I refer to God and our holy father the Pope." Her trial declared her to have been "idolatrous by adoring evil spirits and invoking them." The sentence of rehabilitation said very wisely that "on the question of revelations it is most difficult to furnish a certain judgment, the Blessed Paul having, on the subject of his own revelations, said that he knew not if they came to him in body or in spirit, and on this point referred himself to God." Those who find truth only in what is tangible and visible will believe the visions and the voices to be hallucinations, and may comfort themselves by laughing at electrons. But those who believe the spiritual world to be more real than anything else will not so set aside the faith of St. Jeanne d'Arc: and that is the belief in all ages of the Church of Jesus Christ.

The Dean of St. Paul's, who does not apparently speak as a

man of science, is reported recently to have said,* as to proofs of existence after death, that this is "not a subject on which natural science or psychical research could have anything to say." Sir Oliver Lodge, speaking very definitely as an expert man of science, has a different opinion, and in announcing his conclusions as scientific has stated that they brought him to the belief which theologians had reached by a different road. Those who "rehabilitated" Jeanne d'Arc in 1455, though they certainly believed in the survival of the saints, adopted a wise silence as to their communications with the living.

W. H. Hutton.

Five Centuries of Religion: Volume I., St. Bernard, His Predecessors and Successors, A.D. 1000–1200. By G. G. Coulton. Cambridge, 1923. Pp. xliii + 578. Price 30s. net.

Mr. Coulton's competence and sincerity are both above questioning. The Middle Ages, and especially the mediæval Church, are still the prey of facile generalizations dictated by sentiment or ignorance, or both, and if the author had done no more than challenge and confute many of the falsehoods which pass as history in this department, he would have done us all a meritorious service. It will be difficult for any of those "historians" convicted, on ample evidence, by Mr. Coulton of "downright mis-statements," or "an ignorance which is serenely ignorant of itself," or dogmatism on a period where "their impressions are evidently formed at second hand," ever again to receive credence unless they reform and emulate Mr. Coulton's wide and accurate reading, impartial and documented statement and, above all, his sincerity and love of truth.

"The object of this book," we are told (p. xxxvi), "is to describe, however summarily, the life and work of those myriads of nameless cloisterers who were so naturally dominant in the Middle Ages, and by whose own choice . . . it has come about that their successors count for so little in the world around us." The study of mediæval piety must necessarily put into the foreground that which was Religion in the mediæval sense—namely, the Religion of the Cloister, not of the Hearth. That was essentially the age of institutional religion; the institution was world-wide, its organization regulated and compact, from the Abbot who ruled his cloister, the Bishop his diocese, to the Pope, governor and unifier of the whole machine. Apparently it was a society excellently equipped to discharge the mission

* *Yorkshire Post*, August 26, 1924.

with which it was entrusted and to withstand both opposition and the lapse of time. Yet "steadily and, in general, unsuspectingly that vast army which had held Europe at its feet, marched on from day to day towards its ineluctable fate." Of this vast and striking tragedy Mr. Coulton's treatment is no less sympathetic than masterly; it is wrong to assert that he comes to the portrayal of the mediæval Church and mediæval life with malice prepense or prejudice. If prejudice there be, it is rather for than against; Mr. Coulton says in frank appreciation that these times with which he deals "contain much of the best that has ever been thought or written" (p. 188).

It is impossible to do justice to the width and wealth of evidence adduced by the author all through his book; as an authority on the period Mr. Coulton holds undisputed pre-eminence. From the point of view of Christians and Churchmen, this work is nothing less than epoch-making. Justice has probably been done to both the saints and the sinners of the mediæval Church, but to understand and describe that intermediate class, the comparatively colourless, ordinary crowd, is something new, yet all-important. Here ecclesiastical history has regrettably lagged behind secular; it has too long been obsessed with the aristocracy of the Church, with the pomp and pageantry of pope and bishop, curia and council, and has been slow to recognize that the most valuable picture, the most potent test, must be taken not in creed but in conduct, not in its Faith but in its works. It is so easy, yet so fatal, for Churchmen to imagine that the Church is the world, to forget that what is clear and momentous to the parson reaches the people as vague, half-understood, and only half-essential. To have recognized this and painstakingly and conscientiously to have set down, in all their crudities, the perversions, superstitions, and absurdities held by this intermediate mass—who, like the poor, are always with us—gives Mr. Coulton's book its unique and permanent place, both as a historical study and, even more impressively, as a tract for the times.

Both Church and individual are alike tested by their fruits; the Church by its repercussion on the minds and morals of those to whom it is parent and guide. Of this often unremembered fact Mr. Coulton's book offers an illustration which is didactic, thorough-going, and tragical. Beneath the institution, carefully compacted, seemingly so perfectly equipped as to be almost flawless, lives and crawls its ugly caricature, crude and perverted. This hidden ulcer grew, as we know, unmarked and unheeded; Mr. Coulton's diagnosis—accurate to our mind—and summing-up of the process by which this corruption came and stayed upon the mediæval Church are the

most valuable and the most topical of all his work. First came the gradual dechristianization of the Church, its competition with paganism, especially in thaumaturgy and demonology; the fact has often been recognized, particularly by those who have studied the contest, in the century or two after Constantine, between Christianity and paganism, but never so poignantly and pointedly as here. The Church followed the crowd; people demanded lurid colours and got them. Intense belief in a very diabolical Devil with his disciplined and organized legions to seduce the unwary into a terrorizing hell; utter irreverence combined with utter credulity; debased and debasing superstitions and abominations—these are the result of the paganization of the Christian Church. Again, there is the gradual narrowing down of the idea of the Church: "From its original signification of the whole body of the faithful, it was gradually confined practically to the official clergy, and finally, under the growth of absolutist theories, to the single person of the Pope" (p. 191, *cf.* p. 56). Mediæval Church and State may be identified, but the identification is damning when mediæval Christianity is placed side by side with Apostolic. The key-notes are exclusivism and intolerance, and that when the rise of nationalities and the growing emancipation of the people portended an inevitable collision.

It is unnecessary to discuss these conclusions; they bear unmistakable evidence of truth. It is the insistent recurrence of this burthen throughout the centuries he has studied with such patience and penetration that has made of Mr. Coulton himself something of a prophet in modern religious England. These two fatal factors in mediæval Church history, so clearly brought out in his book, have impelled him to oppose the advocates both of further paganization and of further obeisance to absolutism. History has been his guide and his authority: to subserve the demands of the crowd for what is picturesque without being pure, old without being venerable, or soothing without being transformative is, to his mind, no less iniquitous and destructive than the attempt to claim an intolerant exclusiveness for the Church which Christ, its only head, made free. Earlier works showed us Mr. Coulton as the exponent of a Christianity which is simple and single-hearted, tolerant and charitable to everything but deliberate deceit and ignorance; and patient, manly and unassuming. If we have treated his latest and greatest work from a point of view almost wholly homiletical, it is because he has portrayed in it a very pitiful and poignant spectacle, the ruin and waste of noble potentialities, the momentous and stirring tragedy of the most magnificent institution in all the Church's history brought through

corruption to its doom. The tale is, no doubt, instructive as a massive work of learning, but far more impressive and moving as a tale of inevitable Nemesis; and Tragedy has, after all, to effect the *κάθαρσις παθημάτων*, and of these it would be fatal folly to assert that we are free.*

J. H. Baxter.

NOTICES

A History of Magic and Experimental Science during the First Thirteen Centuries of our Era. By Lynn Thorndike, Ph.D. Macmillan and Co., London, 1923. Two vols. Pp. xl + 835, vi + 1,036. 42s. net.

Covering centuries when for the most part learning was in the hands of the Church, these two volumes require no apology for being noticed in Theology. Of immense importance and value to all interested in medieval man, they are not least important to students of Church history, for they admirably illustrate the *milieu* in which the Church had to work, and for which it was in part responsible. Professor Thorndike's industry and learning can be described by no less a word than prodigious; his book is a storehouse of richly documented fact, to which medievalists will turn time and time again.

The title shows the large field covered, and in this lies at once the strength and the weakness of the work. Perhaps the proportion of space assignable to each section is the reason for a certain lack of detail, at least in the chapters about which the present writer is able to speak, but, on the whole, the book is an amazing repertory. The amount and range of Dr. Thorndike's reading, of original authorities, in print and manuscript, and of the subsidiary literature, will bring envy to lesser men; the list of relevant books and articles consulted makes a lengthy and valuable bibliography; the number of manuscripts discussed is legion, and they are fully catalogued; excellent bibliographical and general indices make the work as useful to consult as they are engrossing to read.

To begin with some criticisms: the volumes are heavy; a lighter paper would have made more comfortable handling without increasing the size. The author's style is occasionally careless and colloquial, with lapses into flippancy which are offensive in a work of sober scholarship. It may be an Americanism to use "who" as a neuter (i., p. 74, "mice *who*"; 173, "sheep *who*"; 260, "fish *who*," etc.), but it is not English. Correct such careless or unidiomatic phrases as "Nor it is true that . . ." (i., p. 112), "depend . . . upon themselves being affected" (*ib.*, 114), "perhaps he had a dim idea along Freudian lines" (178), "in especial" (248), and others. "In especial," Professor Thorndike should never have written such sentences as this (ii., p. 976): "had electric light been invented in Pamphile's day, she would probably have spent her evenings in jazz or at a movie." Perhaps she would, but Dr. Thorndike need not, for a work of grave erudition, accompany her thither to acquire his style. *Noblesse oblige.*

* We reserve our own comments on Mr. Coulton's book to a later number.

Such things are blemishes in a book so interesting and suggestive. In particular, some of the author's conclusions are of value to readers of THEOLOGY: i., p. 12 ff., he questions whether Egypt had reached as advanced a stage as is commonly held, especially (p. 14) whether Egypt can contest the claim of Babylon to precedence in astrology; pp. 20-21, "the strange notion that the ancient Hellenes were unusually free from magic" is rightly described as "a glib assumption"; p. 30, challenges the "exaggerated view of the scientific acquirements of the Hellenic age." Among the most interesting views reached by Dr. Thorndike are the conclusions given in his last chapter (ii., pp. 970 ff.); these thirteen centuries were "no age of retrogression or stagnation as . . . formerly depicted. The ideas and discoveries of Hellenic, not to say oriental, science persisted, and were preserved by medieval men to a greater extent than has been generally recognized; and to them the medieval men added questions, observation, and even discoveries of their own. Not only did curiosity concerning nature's secrets continue, but the authority of the ancients was often received with scepticism; and a marked tendency runs through our period to rely upon rationalism and experimental method." Again (p. 971 f.), the Church's "opposition to scientific research has been grossly exaggerated"; "the moralizing and allegorizing supposed to characterize medieval nature-study have been greatly over-estimated." Such conclusions contradict a good number of the ready generalizations so commonly held about the middle ages, and are all the more welcome as the result of long, careful, and detailed study, such as these ages need and have, as yet, hardly received.

Space forbids our following the author over his wide field; suffice it to say that he has apparently left nothing neglected, and by his immense research into unpublished material has added much, including many problems, to our store. The theological student will derive particular profit from Book V., *Early Christian Thought*, with its chapters on the Book of Enoch, Philo, the Gnostics, the Apocrypha . . . Augustine, and others. The whole discussion here, if occasionally more of a catalogue than a discussion, will be found of excellent service to students of early Christianity, for it illustrates, better than almost anywhere, the background, the environment in which Christianity had to live and grow. Here and there slight corrections are possible,* but on the whole, the discussion is adequate, fully documented, and of unique importance. This book should be in all theological libraries, for it is, in spite of its blemishes, a sound, honest, and original piece of work, to whose author our best thanks are due for his signal learning and patient care.

J. H. BAXTER.

* Pp. 389, 402, "Gelasius' list of apocryphal works, A.D. 494": the author has overlooked recent criticism; p. 398 refers to the *Acta Archelai*, not in Migne, but in the *Griech. chr. Schriftsteller*—so with many of the older editions cited by the author to the neglect of the more critical; Bk. I., p. 8 (contents page), correct *Appollonius;* p. 104, put "Thunderbolt" in index; p. 130, *n.* 4, misprint; pp. 210 foot, 251, *n.* 1, quotation marks; p. 246, *n.* 1 and 3, more usually called "Against Hierocles"; p. 396, *Acts of Paul* discovered 1897 (see the account in *Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, vii., 117 ff.); p. 397, *n.* 2, misprint; p. 819, Gerard of Cremona, add 163; *ib., s.v. Giry* read 765; p. 793, *s.v. Gagates* add 138; p. 797, *Lightning*, add 104; p. 813, Aug. *City of God*, add 241; p. 823, *Mackinnon*, read 640; Index I., *s.v.* anæsthetics, 141 for 142.

LE MIROIR DE L'ÂME. By Henri Hembuche de Langenstein, dit le Hesse. Traduit et annoté par Emmanuel Mistiaen, S.J. Museum Lessianum, C. Beyaert, Bruges, 1923. 1s. 6d.

Langenstein's devotional masterpiece—all the more remarkable because Langenstein was primarily a mathematician, astronomer, and follower of Occam—this little treatise on the soul belongs to the best type of spirituality and mysticism—the "Catholic-Evangelical." It treats mainly of the *via purgativa*—the sense of sin, penitence, contrition, humility; and there is, one fears, a growing danger in English devotion of "skipping" the *via purgativa* for the *via illuminativa* and the *via unitiva*, and of trying to climb the Mount of the Transfiguration before we have climbed Calvary. If I term the "Catholic-Evangelical" the best type of spirituality, it is not because I can agree with Prof. Heiler and others that what is called "counter-reformation spirituality" differs substantially from the "Catholic-Evangelical." Counter-reformation spirituality has its excesses, but fundamentally it is a normal development and outcome of the law of alternation which is a law of growth. Historically the following points are of value in the *Speculum Animae*—to give this work its original title. (1) Its primary method is that of introversion, or the study of Christ within us, rather than of introspection. Here Langenstein is like our own Mother Julian, and is also Augustinian, Victorine, and Teresian, and not, I would think, Plotinian, though he was a philosopher. Abbot Butler would seem to be right in maintaining that too much can be made of the influence of Plotinus in Christian spirituality and mysticism. (2) The *Speculum* teaches the older form of Meditation, which simply means letting the mind and whole Self rest upon the verities of religion. Though found earlier, "Formal" Meditation, as we know it now, really dates from the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola. Langenstein's dates are *c.* 1340-1397. (3) Occam placed the essence of the soul in the will. But the *Speculum* does not teach voluntarism; its view of the soul is rather that of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventura. (4) In view of the controversy between Poulain, Saudreau, Arintero and others, it may be noted that Langenstein teaches the older form of Contemplation—that of St. Gregory the Great, and St. Bernard, from whom he quotes. In other words, he holds Contemplation to be open to all, and a normal development of response to Grace and the Supernatural. If it be true that we are again face to face with the controversy between Bossuet and Fénelon about the nature and operation of the Supernatural in the "higher stages" of the devotional life, the *Speculum* has an additional interest in that Langenstein, though not a Frenchman, was an early Gallican, and held an Ecumenical Council to be above the Pope. It is to be hoped that the Museum Lessianum will also publish his *De contemptu mundi*, a forerunner of our own too much neglected *Manchester Al Mondo*, or *Contemplation of Death and Immortality* by Henry Montagu, 1st Earl of Manchester.

THE ABBOT OF PERSHORE.

PARISH CHURCH ARCHITECTURE. By E. Tyrrell-Green. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

Only by degrees are the people of England learning to understand the importance of the heritage they possess in the mediæval churches so freely scattered over this land. A notion, prevalent in the seventeenth

century, that "the Gothic" was synonymous with "the barbarous," has not quite passed away. Some day, and before long, there will be a general consciousness of the extraordinary worth of these noble works of art found in most of our towns and villages. And the memory will not be revered of recent architects who, in their foolish conceit, attempted to improve such ancient buildings; while all they did was to destroy artistic values and beauties, the meaning of which they were unable to comprehend.

Professor Tyrrell-Green, in his well-produced book, gives a masterly conspectus of the whole subject. This he does in an interesting way, without the use of obscure and technical expressions, and with the help of attractive illustrations. Here is a handbook just fitted for anyone who desires to obtain knowledge in this direction. Any properly educated person would feel ashamed if he knew nothing of the great literature of his country. And such a man ought to be conscious of something defective in his intellectual equipment if all he can do is to look at an old church, overgrown with ivy, and exclaim, "How quaint!"

The author says much that is worth considering about "Perpendicular," as the style of building evolved in Gloucester during the fourteenth century is termed. Noble though the results of this form of design are seen to be, far and wide throughout England, yet there now began a certain decadence in regard to devotional feeling, and to individual craftsmanship. "The typical fifteenth-century Church compels admiration by its spaciousness and lofty proportions; yet there is something lacking about it." Early English work seems to be alive at every point with the personal interest in it of the masons who were employed. With Perpendicular, there starts a change to the use of set and carefully reproduced forms. This method of stereotyped design culminated at the Renaissance, when the architect became all important, and the workmen often had to take the attitude of slave-labourers or of intelligent machines. Such tendency to lose the initiative of individual craftsmanship has been reinforced in our day by admiration for all kinds of machinery, and by the invention of more mechanical processes of building. Are we, then, to despair about the future of noble architecture? Not at all, if architects will avowedly adapt themselves to modern conditions. The rebuilding an Early English chancel is a hopeless endeavour. You only get, as it were, a body that has never lived, tied to one that is deathless in its suggestions of human interest in every detail. But the lines on which Liverpool Cathedral is being constructed—the use of big masses, frankly, as mechanical structures—that method does contain within it the promise of great things yet to come.

Such considerations, however, ought to make us the more eager to understand and to conserve every building that has come down from an absolutely unique period in the history of architecture. And towards this desirable end *Parish Church Architecture* will be no small help.

GEORGE GARDNER.

ACUTE AND CHRONIC UNBELIEF. By A. C. Wyckoff. Fleming H. Revell and Company. New York. $1.50.

This is a vigorous attack on those psychologists of religion who use their science for the purpose of discrediting religious belief. Professor Wyckoff's method is to show that psychological complexes underlie

what he calls "sub-beliefs" and "super-beliefs." By sub-beliefs he means such conditions as acute and chronic unbelief, and he analyzes the unbelief of Professor Leuba, Nietzsche, and other opponents of religion. Super-beliefs are such systems as Christian Science, New Thought, Occultism, etc., which are adopted by those who lack the beliefs of normal religion. He traces out the complexes which produce such unbelief and super-belief, and maintains that without these complexes, people would have what he calls "normal religion"—*i.e.*, belief in a personal God, in prayer, and in Jesus Christ.

There is a good deal of acute psychological observation in these chapters, although it is not very systematic. Professor Wyckoff has shown that the analytic method can be used for religious belief in the same way as its opponents use it against religion. The criticism which suggests itself is that this method is really equally irrelevant to the questions of the truth and the untruth of belief. One can have bad reasons for believing what is true, as well as for believing what is false. One cannot prove the truth or untruth of a belief merely by investigating the reasons for which people believe it, although this investigation may be important in other ways. We may also doubt whether there is really a *normal* religion which can be contrasted with *sub-normal* or *super-normal* beliefs. The normal religion of Professor Wyckoff is the religion he believes in, and if we believe in the same religion we shall agree with him in calling it "normal." Presumably Mrs. Eddy would have a different standard of normality in religion. The author seems to make the unwarrantable assumption that his "normal religion" is in a unique condition of imperviousness to the psychological attacks he makes against unbelief and super-beliefs.

The merit of Professor Wyckoff's work is that it shows that the analytic method of attack can be used as successfully (though no more successfully) against unbelief as it can against belief. If his work seems to English readers to be too polemical to be convincing, they must remember that it is written in a different atmosphere from theirs. In America, religious controversy seems to be carried on with a fierceness and bitterness that we left behind fifty years ago. This book is the pronouncement of an advocate, not of a judge, but an advocate has a place of importance in threshing out such questions as these.

R. H. Thouless.

Question Time in Hyde Park. By C. F. Rogers. S.P.C.K. 6s. net.

Real gratitude is due to Professor Rogers for this most interesting and useful book of simple popular apologetics. In the first place, the mere collection of questions to be answered is of high value. All of them were actually asked him in Hyde Park on Sunday afternoons, with few, if any, exceptions, and they may therefore be taken as typical of the difficulties felt by the casual person who is vaguely interested in religious matters, hopelessly uninstructed, and not very sympathetic towards any organized expression of Christianity.

At least three points strike the reader with amazement at these questions: their limited scope, their implied acquaintance with certain scraps of quite abstruse information, and their essential superficiality. In all three respects we believe they are typical, not only of the uneducated, but of very many of the professional classes who stand aloof from religious organizations. They mainly concern problems of free-will, the compara-

tive value of different religious systems, the theories that Christ is a myth, and the New Testament late in date and unhistorical, a few problems about science and the Reformation, and some modern questions chiefly of a quasi-political character. They indicate neither historical knowledge nor a historical sense. It is obvious that the only way to meet them is by education in logical method and by dissemination of scientifically rendered facts.

There is no short cut to the attainment of such remedies, but they simply have to be applied; and we believe that the right point to apply them is among those classes which are capable of some intellectual effort. If these are convinced, their convictions may be expected to filter down like the references met with in these questions to Tacitus and the Essenes. It goes without saying that we must desist in all our schools of every grade from making the Old and New Testaments a vehicle for properly boring and priggish moral casuistry, and teach them as the records of a genuine religious experience.

Professor Rogers meets these questions with answers at once remarkably simple, apt, ready, and practical. Above all, he is always taking the questioner deeper than his question. Time and again the questions reveal a spirit of criticism rather than of true enquiry; there is lack of desire to believe or understand, a moral deficiency. And time and again the answers after meeting the particular query gently but directly suggest where the real trouble lies.

At the end of each section the Professor has collected a little anthology from ancient and modern writers and authorities of very varied kinds, well adapted to illustrate some of the points raised in the preceding questions and answers. And there is an index. And finally, let no one imagine that the completed work is dry. It is delightfully woven together, and makes really good reading.

LEONARD PRESTIGE.

BOOK NOTES

The Philosophy of the Upanishads. By S. Radhakrishnan. George Allen and Unwin. 5s. A section of the author's work, in two volumes, on Indian Philosophy, is here reprinted, with Introductions by Rabindranath Tagore and Edmond Holmes, both of whom express the opinion that the present age stands in need of the teaching of the Upanishads. Hitherto Geden's translation of Deussen's work on *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* has generally served as the English student's introduction to this important phase of Indian thought, and for the future this should by no means be abandoned; but it may be usefully supplemented by Professor Radhakrishnan's study, for in this is to be found the interesting point of view of an Eastern thinker who, frankly recognizing that "almost anybody may seek in them (the Upanishads) what he wants and find what he seeks," and admitting that "it is difficult to be confident that one's working up of elements which knew neither method nor arrangement is the correct one," expounds what he holds to be the essential truth of the teaching of the Upanishads, illustrating his exposition in many places by reference to Western philosophical and theological thought. The book contains a not very helpful summary of contents at the head of the first section, but lacks an index. *The Religion of a Layman.* By Charles R. Brown. The Macmillan Co. 4s. A brief, crisp, direct, and forceful presentation of the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, which should prove of value as a book of practical religion to be put into the

hands of the modern man. *Reality and Religion.* Meditations on God, Man, and Nature. By Sadhu Sundar Singh. With an Introduction by Canon Streeter. Macmillan. 2s. 6d. A personal interest in the Sadhu will persuade many to read these brief meditations, in all of which they will find, as Canon Streeter says, "the direct simplicity of religious insight." There could hardly be a greater contrast to the book just noticed; and yet both breathe the true spirit of Christianity. *Mystica Isagoge.* Brevis totius Mysticae Theologiae Synopsis. By P. Fr. Joseph a Spiritu Sancto. 6th edition. Edited by P. Fr. Anastasio a S. Paulo. Charles Beyaert, Bruges. 12.50 frs. With the publication of this first part of the first volume the publishers inaugurate the issue of a new edition of the writer's *Cursus theologiae mystico-scholasticae* in six volumes at a subscription price of 300 frs. This instalment gives a good assurance of the careful editing and admirable printing of the work, and at the same time has independent value as affording a convenient survey of the whole ground of Roman mystical theology. The editor says of it, "Haec Isagogae specialis editio ad majorem S. Theologiae mysticae studentium utilitatem facta est. Optimus enim liber est manualis ad usum alumnorum." *St. Thomas Aquinas as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture.* By Hugh Pope, O.P. *Veritas: The Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.* By Aelred Whitacre, O.P., S.T., Praes. *The Mysticism of St. Thomas Aquinas.* By Vincent McNabb, O.P. *St. Thomas Aquinas as a Philosopher.* By A. E. Taylor, M.A. Blackwell, Oxford. 9d. each. These four papers were read at Manchester University in May last at the celebrations of the sixth Centenary of the Canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas, and deserve the attention of the many who would agree with Professor Taylor that much mere fumbling in the dark "might have been escaped if the gentlemen of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had been willing to do less sneering at Aquinas and more study of him." *Le Secret de la Confession.* Étude historico-canonique. By Léon Honoré, S.J. Charles Boyaert, Bruges. 10 frs. Among the many serious dangers attaching to the restoration of the use of sacramental confession without due provision for the instruction and training of priests in this very important part of their work must be reckoned the possibility of individuals determining for themselves what is meant by "the seal of confession." A knowledge of the Church's strict interpretation of this phrase is essential, and no better book can be found for the purpose of giving an appreciation of the sacredness of the duty of secrecy than this new historical survey. At the close of the book the writer is justifiably concerned to make reply to the charges brought by Lea against his own Society, but apart from this the work is a careful presentation of historical development, written to show that the seal is to be regarded as absolutely inviolable. *Lenten Meditations.* By Mother Clare Fey. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 5s. Forty meditations on the Passion of Jesus Christ, six on the "Reproaches" of the Redeemer, and seven on the Sorrows of our Blessed Lady, spoken aloud by the foundress of the Congregation of the Poor Child Jesus, and taken down in shorthand by two of the Sisters, are here presented in a translation made from the original German by a member of the Congregation. There is much in them to make any who may use them grateful to the Congregation for thus sharing with others the devotional thoughts of a holy woman. *Christ and the Critics.* By Hilarin Felder, O.M.Cap. Translated from the original German by John L. Stoddard. Vol. i. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 12s. 6d. The

first volume of Dr. Felder's reply to critics of the doctrine of the Incarnation is a substantial piece of work, showing great industry, ability, and charity. The author is never contemptuous or smart, but gives to all a fair hearing, gets skilfully to the root of their objections, and attempts to meet them with direct and uncompromising but wholly courteous reply. Apart from his use of the Fourth Gospel, which would be questioned by many, he fails seriously in only one point. He appears to be unwilling to recognize any growth in our Lord's self-consciousness. His treatment of the Temptation suggests that there was in it no single element of real temptation, and he appears to hold the view that from the first dawn of consciousness the Child knew Himself for what He really was. This rules out at a stroke not only the rationalism of hostile critics, but also many loyal attempts to expound the Incarnation rationally as a true conjunction of Divinity and humanity. O. H.

The Christ of the Testament. By P. E. More. Princeton University Press (London, Milford). 13s. 6d. This rather expensive American book forms the fourth volume of a series by the same writer, the first three of which are on Platonism, The Religion of Plato, and Hellenistic Philosophies. The standpoint can be deduced from the following quotations: "I am not minimizing the results of German research, on which indeed I am making heavy draughts in the writing of this book; but I am asserting that the Kantian metaphysic spells death to philosophy, and that the Lutheran theology spells death to religion" (p. 119). The Virgin Birth is "manifestly legendary," the Resurrection appearances were true hallucinations. "There are elements in his (St. Paul's) character which distinctly repel me." The book is ably written from a rather professorial standpoint, but does not contribute much to the vexed questions of New Testament study. The Bishop of Manchester is described as "the chaplain of the Archbishop of Canterbury, a scholarly churchman in good standing." *Israel before Christ.* By A. W. F. Blunt. Oxford Press. 2s. 6d. This very useful summary of the "Social and Religious Development in the Old Testament" will receive a welcome from many who want to know where we stand to-day as regards O.T. problems. Canon Blunt has used the best and latest authorities, and written his own sketch with considerable skill. He presupposes the results of literary criticism. The reader who wants to know the reasons for rearranging the traditional order of the Old Testament documents must look elsewhere. *St. Antony the Hermit.* By St. Athanasius. Translated from Migne by Dom J. B. McLaughlin, O.S.B. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 3s. Bishop Gibson's translation of this famous document is all that one could require so far as accuracy goes, but the *Nicene Fathers Library* cannot be read in the train or taken out for a country walk. This charmingly printed new edition serves both these purposes. It has no notes; so there is still room for an edition which will introduce the reader to the researches of Reitzenstein, Bousset, and others who have done so much to illuminate the transition from heathen to Christian modes of thought. *Was Holy Communion instituted by Jesus?* By D. S. Guy. S. C. M. 6s. Canon Guy, a busy Harrogate Vicar, has a knowledge of recent books which many a man engaged in academic work might envy. His book is designed for the general theological public, not for specialists. Our only complaint is that for his public a shorter and cheaper book would have been better. A good deal of space is taken up by sentences which suggest the preacher, and by names of investigators which are merely names for most readers.

The book is a careful and useful piece of work. We think, however, that Canon Guy hardly stated the issues with sufficient clearness. If the New Testament is isolated from the worshipping community out of which it grew, and the various writers are set against one another as disagreeing witnesses, then the evidence for our Lord's having instituted the Eucharist is insufficient. But most of our practical as well as doctrinal Christianity goes too, judged by the same standards. The particular issue here debated is part of the whole Modernist controversy. A book which approaches the well-worn subject from this angle is a refreshing change, and we thank the author for it. *The Vesperal.* Burns Oates and Washbourne. 7s. 6d. The publishers who issue this book have recently been appointed publishers in England to the Holy See. "The Vesperal" is a typical example of their enterprise. It belongs to a series *The Liturgy for Layfolk,* and contains Vespers and Compline, both in Latin and English, with all their variations, in a beautiful volume of pocket size, comprising about 1,000 pages. "It supplies a form of Evening Prayer, serving not only for the following of Vespers and Compline in Church, but also for private use in one's own home. No more inspiring form of Evening Prayer exists than that proposed by the Catholic Church, used and meditated upon by innumerable Saints, and day by day on the lips of her ministers." The appearance of this book is one more evidence of the strength of the liturgical movement in the Roman Catholic Church. *Reality in Bible Readings.* By F. Ballard. T. and T. Clark. 6s. This lively and well-written book can be highly recommended, all the more so because the average priest will disagree with much of it. Dr. Ballard illustrates the unintelligibility of the Authorized Version of the New Testament, and even of much of the Revised, by a discussion of over 400 passages. His proposed translations into modern English are thought-provoking, but often fail to convince. Frequently they are paraphrases rather than translations, and as such fitly find their place in a private venture version, but not in an official Bible for use in public worship, in which caution must predominate. Dr. Ballard says "undoubtedly" the two words for love in John xxi. 15-19 have different meanings. There is grave doubt, see THEOLOGY, May, 1924. The "virgin" of 1 Cor. vii. becomes "spiritual bride." I agree that this is the probable meaning, but think it is hardly certain enough to be put into an official version. A characteristic comment is made on 1 Tim. vi. 9, 10, "The love of money is the root of all evil." "It is high time that this statement . . . which is manifestly false was corrected." But the author of the Pastorals is quoting a popular proverb, and Dr. Ballard's criticism is naïve. 1 Tim. iv. 8 is rendered "physical exercise is a good thing in its way." To read "bodily exercise profiteth little" is "to slight . . . all attempts at physical development." What a curious argument! Dr. Ballard, with all his modernity—he thinks little of the Old Testament, and says of the Lord's Prayer it "is not even a prayer at all, any more than A B C is the alphabet"—yet seems to believe that our attitude towards physical culture will be affected by whether πρὸς ὀλίγον is translated "little" or "a little." Churchmen are more influenced by the atmosphere of their services, the sense of the Beyond and Above, than by the intellectual comprehension of all they hear, and for this very reason will profit by reading this earnest protest on behalf of the rational and intelligible.

W. K. L. CLARKE.

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